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The primary question addressed in this thesis is: What changed in Brazil that gave 
rise to a heightened social and political climate of anticorruption between 2007 and 
2017? More specifically, what changes enabled Brazilian judicial empowerment, making 
it possible to investigate and hold accountable the corrupt among the economic and 
political elite? This research analyzes governance and democratization theory, and the 
varied incentives that influence public officials and encourage them to adopt policies to 
restrict their own corrupt practices. The research identifies a strong link between Brazil’s 
international ambitions and the resultant influence that external forces placed on the 
nation to enable transformative judicialization with respect to government corruption. 
These findings have application both in the domestic fight in Brazil against corruption as 
well as the international effort to promote equity and influence good governance practices 
abroad. 
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The primary question addressed in this thesis is: What changed in Brazil that gave 
rise to a heightened social and political climate of anticorruption between 2007 and 
2017? More specifically, what changes enabled Brazilian judicial empowerment, making 
it possible to investigate and hold accountable the corrupt among the economic and 
political elite? This question acknowledges that corruption is perceived to be endemic in 
Brazil and that there have been multiple previous anticorruption programs; however, 
earlier attempts did little to change the political climate of impunity among white collar 
criminals.  
Brazil’s judicial system is historically overburdened and full of loopholes, which 
allow legal proceedings to exceed the statute of limitations and permit implicated 
politicians and the elite to carry on for years, only minimally affected by the judicial 
process. Evidence of concrete change emerged during the mensalão trials of 2010, when 
the Brazilian Supreme Court convicted a seated politician for the first time since the return 
of democracy in 1985.1 Prior to 2010, corruption investigations may have forced an 
implicated politician to resign or, at worst, be expelled from office. Since 2015, however, 
the lava jato (car wash) operation has demonstrated a much greater institutional capacity to 
gather evidence, implicate defendants and prosecute them while also recouping millions of 
dollars lost in vast money laundering schemes. The intent of this thesis is to identify the 
key changes that have recently empowered a judiciary that was previously unable to put 
corrupt politicians and businessmen behind bars. This thesis argues that exogenous forces 
ultimately enabled the movement towards anticorruption reform in Brazil. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
Over the past three decades, Brazil has developed economically at an accelerated 
rate compared to most nations, and stands as an example to the developing world of the 
progress that can be achieved in poorer regions. As of 2016, Brazil was the world’s ninth 
                                                 
1 Sergio Praça and Matthew M. Taylor, “Inching Toward Accountability: The Evolution of Brazil’s 
Anticorruption Institutions, 1985–2010,” Latin American Politics and Society 56, no. 2, (Summer 2014): 
41, doi: 10.1111/j.1548-2456.2014.00230.x.  
 2
largest economy, after slipping a few places due to the economic retraction that started in 
2014.2 Complicating Brazil’s rise has been the vast economic disparity that dates back to 
its founding in the sixteenth century as an extraction colony to a European empire. The 
reintroduction of democracy in 1985 and the subsequent economic turnaround Brazil has 
experienced facilitated the institutional and social developments that have lifted 
approximately forty million Brazilians out of extreme poverty.3 Despite the many 
successes achieved by Brazil, there are many lingering challenges. Economic disparity is 
still a significant issue, drug and gang related violence is often responded to by police 
brutality, and the political system is awash with informal institutions, personalist 
politicians, and corruption, all of which reward the rich and penalize the poor.  
In 2004, senior members of the president’s Workers Party (PT) were accused of 
running a vote buying scheme, dubbed the mensalão, or big monthly allowance, in which 
the president’s administration was handing out hefty kickbacks to congressional partners 
in return for political loyalty. It took the case seven years to reach Brazil’s highest court, 
but in the end accomplished something that had not been done before in Brazilian 
politics: it convicted 25 of the nation’s wealthiest and most powerful citizens and 
sentenced them to prison terms.4 The scandal transfixed the nation, as the public watched 
the proceedings on live television, and watched a historically inept judicial system 
overpower the impunity of white-collar crime.  
In 2016, the economy was in the third year of a deep recession, and President 
Dilma Rousseff was already impeached for illegally masking the economic crisis with 
funds from the state-run bank prior to her reelection.5 On top of that, in 2015, a newly 
empowered judiciary began to unravel another political scandal, labeled lava jato, which 
                                                 
2 “The World’s Top Ten Economies,” Investopedia, accessed February 25, 2016, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ investing/022415/worlds-top-10-economies.asp. 
3 “Bolsa Família: Changing the Lives of Millions in Brazil,” World Bank, accessed January 21, 2017, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21447054~
pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
4 Ben Tavener, “Guilty Verdicts for Forming the Mensalão,” Rio Times, October 23, 2012, 
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/front-page/guilty-verdicts-for-forming-mensalao-scheme-in-brazil/. 
5 Heloisa Mendonca, “Perícia Sobre Pedalada Gera Constrangimento, Mas Não Altera Desfecho do 
Impeachment,” El Pais, June 30, 2016, http://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2016/06/28/politica/
1467141285_004935.html. 
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has surprisingly led to a much more rapid and wide spread prosecution of the political 
and economic elite. This new scandal has put more elites behind bars in two years than 
the mensalão was able to do in seven. Unfortunately, all of this occurred in the lead up to 
Brazil hosting the world’s two largest international events, the World Cup in soccer and 
the Olympics. This thesis is significant because it identifies conditions by which Brazil 
increased its institutional capacity to fight corruption, a problem that exists throughout 
the world. This analysis extracts lessons from Brazil’s tough lessons and how they can be 
applied to similarly challenged countries.  
B. DEFINITIONS 
Corruption has a profound impact on state development; it is said that “in the 
worst cases, it costs lives; short of this, it costs people their freedom, health, or money.”6 
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Index, Brazil falls at number 79 
out of 176 nations.7 It is estimated that corruption in Brazil consumes between 2–5 
percent of the annual GDP.8 With implications as severe as these, certainly understanding 
corruption in one of the world’s largest nations can help us understand how to combat 
similar problems in nations around the world. Understanding the extent of corruption is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, and as such, the discussion here is based on a basic 
definition of corruption, which is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”9 
Expanding on this definition, corruption can be observed in many forms, including 
bribery, kickbacks, extortion, embezzlement, nepotism, illicit enrichment, or public abuse 
of functions.10 
                                                 
6 “What Is Corruption?,” Transparency International, accessed August 17, 2016, 
https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#costs-of-corruption. 
7 “Corruption Perception Index 2016,” Transparency International, accessed February 9, 2017, 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016. 
8 Alfred P. Montero, Brazil: Reversal of Fortunes (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014), 
https://read.amazon.com/. 
9 “How Do You Define Corruption,” Transparency International, accessed March 3, 2017, 
http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#define. 
10 Andy Spalding and The University of Richmond Law School Anti-Corruption Team, “Chapter 1: 
When the Games Transcend the Games: Globalization, Corruption, and the New Olympic Legacy,” 
Richmond University School of Law, accessed October 15, 2016, http://law.richmond.edu/olympics/
chapters/brazil_chapter1.pdf. 
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Brazil is experiencing an important transformation, unfortunately for Brazilians it 
comes at what would seem a very inopportune time due to the economic downturn. 
Throughout the challenges it is experiencing, the nation has doubled down on 
anticorruption reforms and has the ability to emerge a better stronger nation. One piece of 
evidence comes from the Brazilian definition of corruption that emerged from legislation 
following nationwide protests against the government in June of 2013. The new law, 
12.850, defines organized crime as collaborating with the objective of obtaining, 
advantages of any nature, either directly or indirectly.11 The very clarification of 
corruption enabled the charges of corruption be brought against multiple defendants in 
the Petrobras scandal since its discovery in 2014. Among those accused in the scandal 
are a former president and the speaker of the lower house and several of their peers. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the catalyst that enabled the judiciary to 
finally convict some of the most powerful individuals in Brazil on crimes of corruption. 
Information to support the statements in this thesis are drawn from both Brazilian and 
other sources. These sources include scholarly analyses on the subjects of corruption and 
governance combined with historical and contemporary accounts that illustrate the 
context of Brazil’s anticorruption reforms. These accounts demonstrate that the 
anticorruption evolution has occurred through gradual reinforcement of democratic 
practices as well as by the influence of nongovernment entities. The three primary 
schools of thought in this paper, contend that the most important influence in Brazil’s 
anticorruption transformation was motivated from either the top-down, bottom-up, or 
other outside mechanism. 
Supporting the top-down model, Brazil’s democracy has progressively worked 
toward consolidation for over thirty years. The state made many incremental 
improvements to laws and institutions that facilitated a favorable environment for judicial 
change. Corruption is not a new element in Brazil; what is however, is the sudden ability 
                                                 
11 Organização Criminosa, Law No. 12.850 (August 2, 2013), http://www.planalto.gov.br/
ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2013/lei/l12850.htm. 
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to do something about it. Brazil’s democratization and emerging judicialization is, an 
important balancing of the state institution against historical networks of personalist 
politics and a weak party system that thrives on cross-party coalition building, shady 
networks, lucrative bribes and political appointments. Thus, the efficacy of top-down 
democratic consolidation to produce transparency is a tenuous argument because it relies 
on the merits of an already corrupt organization to take action against itself. 
Arguing for the power of domestic empowerment is made easily when observing 
the monumental social and development growth Brazil has achieved since 2000. As a 
result, Brazil began to provide more in welfare and education programs that have lifted 
millions out of extreme poverty and substantially improved the education level of the 
lower quintiles of society.12 These improvements rapidly expanded the Brazilian middle 
class, which, in turn, has applied greater pressure on the state to improve overall capacity 
to serve the public. Additionally, there is a greater awareness of domestic issues, and 
global norms, facilitated by rapidly growing access to the 24-hour news cycle and social 
media. Social empowerment is a critical part of this transformation, however the 
argument here is that the people would not have begun to protest in June of 2013 if the 
conditions for a social movement had not been created by an outside entity. 
Although Brazil had previously begun to make strides against corruption through 
natural democratic evolution and civic activism, it is argued here that international forces 
were the key to change. As Brazil grew into one of the world’s largest economies and 
demonstrated sustained progress as a developing nation, it received both international 
attention and influence. Coincidentally, Brazil’s greatest international opportunity to 
shine overlaps with some of its most trying democratic moments, as a result of the 
corruption scandals. The first event was in December 2003, when Brazil signed onto the 
UN Convention against Corruption, then the mensalão scandal was uncovered the 
following year. While the mensalão was mulled over for the next several years, Brazil 
was selected in 2007 to host the World Cup and in 2009 to host the Summer Olympics. A 
                                                 
12 Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, is a very cost effective Conditional Cash Transfer program that is credited 
with helping approximately 40 million Brazilians out of extreme poverty. Extreme poverty is considered to 
be anyone living on less than $1.50 a day. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia costs the government about 0.5 percent of 
the nation’s GDP.  
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year later in 2010, Brazil began to convict politicians found guilty of corruption. Shortly 
after these events, Brazil went on to adopt other significant transparency measures that 
would challenge endemic corruption, such as a new government procurement law (2011), 
plea-bargaining (2013), and appeals reforms (2015). It is relevant to note that these 
events and initiatives were not linear and there was significant effort on the part of 
devoted and loyal citizens to achieve Brazil’s anticorruption moment. Yet, this thesis 
concludes that nongovernment actors encouraged changes to the law, exposing the hidden 
practices of a corrupt class of politicians and businessmen. The decision to host the 
Olympics and World Cup applied the needed pressure to send dormant civic discontent 
into the streets and IGOs and NGOs created a path for the executive and legislative 
branches to surrender power to the judiciary vis-a-vis corruption.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The following chapters are written so that each is a foundation for subsequent 
chapters; they also work together to build an overall structure to support the main thesis 
of this argument. Chapter II provides a brief historical summary of Brazil, to include an 
introduction to the lava jato and mensalão investigations. Chapters III, IV, and V cover 
the three competing theories of reform; democratic consolidation, domestic 
accountability, and exogenous forces. Each chapter begins by introducing various 
scholarly insights that are applied within the chapter to evaluate the events and decisions 
that unfolded to produce transparency in Brazil. It is important to note at the outset, that 
each of these approaches to reform are also contributing factors to the overall 
transformation; however, as previously stated this thesis argues that exogenous influences 
ultimately triggered Brazil’s sudden judicial empowerment. 
  
 7
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZIL 
Brazil is distinguished by five geographic regions with distinct socio-economic 
histories, they are depicted in Figure 1. The Southern region is the smallest region but 
due to its high concentration of European emigrants, it developed differently than the 
northern regions and it became the second wealthiest region.13 The Southeast contains 
the two largest cities, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, and remains the nation’s industrial 
heart.14 The Northeast has survived on the regions rich agricultural capacity, yet it is the 
poorest region, producing an average income of only two-thirds the national average.15 
The center-west is the agricultural frontier, it is sparsely populated, but since it became 
the home to the nation’s capital, Brasilia, in the 1960s it became the link between the 
coast and the far reaches of the world’s fifth largest nation.16 The Amazonian north 
accounts for 60 percent of Brazilian land mass and about one-eighth of the country’s 
population, but like the Northeast, it too is financially behind the southern regions.17  
By comparison to its Spanish neighbors, Brazil experienced a relatively peaceful 
transition away from its colonial past. However, in its path to stable democracy, it too has 
struggled with a patrimonial heritage, and a very small upper class distinguished by a 
large income gap from the common citizen. Following the nations re-democratization in 
the mid-1980s, it struggled to shake off pervasive political corruption. Brazil has long 
struggled with its impressive potential and periods of prosperity that are undermined by 
poor economic policy, timing, or the selfish pretenses of politicians that are motivated by 
their own enrichment rather than providing good governance. Alfred Montero stated that 
                                                 
13 Michael Reid, Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2014), 12. 
14 Ibid., 13. 
15 Ibid., 15. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 16. 
 8
clientelism and patronage are endemic in Brazilian politics, and “too much of the 
oligarchical and authoritarian past lingers.”18 
Figure 1.  Brazil’s Regions and States.19  
 
The crux of Brazil’s problem is not its people and their culture, but the 
incompleteness of its political system that perpetuates corruption through a complex 
political entanglement between branches of government combined with an absence of 
both accountability and the power to enforce institutional control measures.20 One of the 
primary conduits of endemic corruption in Brazil is the system’s design that permits 
                                                 
18 Alfred P. Montero, Brazil: Reversal of Fortune (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014), 
https://read.amazon.com/. 
19 Source: “Mapa do Brasil,” John in Brazil Blog, accessed February 8, 2017, 
http://www.johninbrazil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/mapa_do_brasil.gif. 
20 Eduardo Mello and Matias Spektor, “How to Fix Brazil,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 5 (September/
October 2016): 104, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/how-fix-brazil. 
 9
presidents and elected officials to appoint their allies to “plum jobs” in state-run 
companies and regulatory agencies.21 It is through these political networks that illicit 
money exchanges hands, presumably below the visibility of the public as well as 
transparency organizations. 
Historically, corruption is considered part of Brazil’s “genetic code,” systemic to 
a “backward society built on inequality and oppression, controlled by a tiny elite.”22 In 
Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index, Brazil ranked 79 out of 
176 counties.23 Figure 2 shows how Brazil has been observed by Transparency 
International since 1995. This chapter looks into the history of corruption in Brazil, and it 
is divided into three main sections, the first summarizes the history prior to 1985, the 
second is a summary of the current democratization from 1985 to the present, and finally 
closes with an introduction to the mensalão and lava jato corruption cases. The history 
herein provides important context pertinent to the discussions in subsequent chapters. 
Figure 2.  Brazil Corruption Index24 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 107. 
22 Paulo Sotero, “Brazil’s Rise Against Corruption,” The Wilson Center, May 10, 2016, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/brazilians-rise-against-corruption.  
23 “Corruption Perception Index 2016.” 
24 Source: “Brazil Corruption Index,” Trading Economics, accessed January 16, 2017, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/brazil/corruption-index. 
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A. PRE-1985 DEMOCRATIZATION 1500–1889 
Portugal began colonizing Brazil after its discovery in 1500. The Portuguese 
sought to exploit whatever wealth they could discover in the new world. Initially, sugar 
cane was the most abundant and profitable resource, but it required an immense amount 
of labor. The Portuguese first sought to enslave the natives, to make the colony function, 
but the indigenous resisted “by waging war, by fleeing, and by refusing to perform forced 
labor.”25 To keep up with the demand they resorted to importing slaves from Africa. In 
total, the Portuguese imported approximately five million slaves to Brazil, more than any 
other region in the Americas.26  
In 1808, Napoleon conquered Portugal and Spain, but unlike the Spanish colonies 
that were temporarily relieved of European control, the Portuguese royal family fled to 
Rio de Janeiro, where King Joao VI ruled his kingdom until he returned to Portugal in 
1821. The period from 1808–1821 is known as the kingdom of Portugal and Brazil. Upon 
the king’s departure, his son Pedro I was left to manage Brazil. Within one year, 
however, Pedro declared independence from Portugal, and established a new governing 
body under a constitutional monarchy making the new Empire of Brazil.27 In 1833 the 
British abolished slavery in the Caribbean and began to pressure others to do the same. 
Slave trading to Brazil ceased in 1850, but was not abolished until 1888.28 The empire 
and its early constitution remained intact until Dom Pedro II was deposed and exiled in 
1889.29  
1. The Old Republic 1889–1930 
Following the military coup that ended the Empire of Brazil, a new constitution 
was created in 1891, modeled after the North American republican design.30 Shortly after 
                                                 
25 Boris Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 17. 
26 Ibid., 16, 36. 
27 Ibid., 76, 79. 
28 Ibid., 109. 
29 Ibid., 115. 
30 Ibid., 146. 
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its establishment, the fledgling republic experienced a financial crisis, and a power 
struggle between the landed elite, the military, and new republicanism. The government 
was too weak to manage the entire state, so power was dispersed to the lower 
municipalities making the new republic “federative.”31 The nation continued to grow and 
expand relying on rich agriculture and mining. Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais became the 
backbone financial center of the nation, but when an ideological break divided the elite in 
the two neighboring states, the original republic collapsed to a revolution led by the 
reformist candidate Getúlio Vargas after he lost the 1930 election.32 
2. Vargas and the Estado Novo 1930–1945 
Vargas is considered the “Father of Brazil,” and his impact continues until today. 
His leadership can be broken into three periods prior to 1945: first, as head of the 
provisional government (1930–1934); second, as president (1933–34); and third, as 
dictator (1937–1945).33 Vargas inspired and led a successful revolution for 
industrialization, and pressed forward in office to suppress the middle class and popular 
dissent. He engineered a strong centralized government by abolishing the constitution of 
1889, dissolving congress, and appointing political cronies to replace previously elected 
officials.34 Under his direction, a new constitution was created and in July of 1934 he 
was indirectly elected president by the constituent assembly.35 By 1937, he was 
uncontested but after multiple leftist uprisings, Vargas found motivation for staging a 
coup to ensure he would stay in power. After stamping out any real or pretended contest 
to his authority, he shut down the congress and canceled the upcoming elections of 1938, 
again abolishing the constitution and declaring the Estado Novo (new state) and his new 
dictatorship. 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 146. 
32 Ibid., 186. 
33 Ibid., 193. 
34 Reid, Troubled Rise, 80. 
35 Fausto, History of Brazil, 206. 
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Vargas retained control of the government by carefully managing his allies and 
maintaining a close bond with the military. The Estado Novo saw the military more than 
double in size and importance. In 1942 the military budget peaked at 36.5 percent of the 
national budget.36 Vargas chose to support the fight for democracy in Europe, and even 
committed 25,000 troops to fight alongside the Allies in Italy.37 The irony of his 
decisions was not lost on his subordinates, dissent began to fracture his support, and the 
demand for elections grew difficult to ignore. Vargas conceded to elections, and was not 
short on creativity in doing so. He chose to reinvent himself and the country one more 
time, permitting elections for congress and the presidency in 1945. Two political parties 
were created, both led by military officers, anticipating the military was the only vehicle 
powerful enough to compete with Vargas. After the elections, the army forced him to 
resign all authority beyond the new elections.  
3. Second Republic 1945–1964 
The second Brazilian republic was a new era of democratization, and produced 
another constitution by 1946. Following Vargas’ resignation and brief retirement, he 
returned to politics, emerging as a populist candidate and “leader of the masses,” as he 
called it.38 Mired by economic challenges, Vargas’ final stint as the nation’s leader 
culminated in his suicide, after a failed murder attempt on another politician.39 Timothy 
Power remarked that the era between Vargas and the military coup of 1964, was turbulent 
but demonstrated the enduring legacy of Vargas, noting that all but one of his successors 
was “forged” during the Vargas administration, and carried on many of his policies.40  
Following Vargas’ death, Juscelino Kubitschek took office and stabilized the 
nation while making the economy grow again. Kubitschek, a visionary, also pushed to 
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have a new federal city built in the interior, away from Rio. In doing so, he invented a 
city of politicians built for political intrigue away from public scrutiny, laying the 
groundwork for an unrestrained breeding ground for corruption.41 Following Kubitschek, 
the nation lacked a clear leader that could maintain his level of innovation while 
balancing the demands of various factions, namely the military, which was experiencing 
its own infighting. When João Goulart failed to unify the government and the military, he 
became more radically left and distant from the conservative military leadership. Goulart 
sealed his fate by supporting an incident of mutiny and insubordination in Rio by a band 
of junior enlisted troops; this act of infidelity pushed the military to turn on him and 
within 24 hours the military had seized control of the government.42 
4. Military Regime 1964–1985 
Many expected that the military intervention was to stabilize the country until the 
1965 election, but instead the military began a twenty-year period of bureaucratic 
authoritarian rule.43 The new regime began to direct changes and repress the opposition 
using Atos Institucionais (Institutional Acts), under the justification that it was the 
“constituent power, which is inherent in all revolutions.”44 The military gave itself power 
to purge congress and remove leftist politicians but permitted limited democratic 
institutions to continue. Fearing a return from previous presidents, Goulart and 
Kubitschek were stripped of their political rights for ten years and all previous parties 
were abolished and replaced by two new ones created by the regime.45  
The regime militarized government functions and recruited technocrats to 
reengineer the economy. During the Emilio Garrastazu Médici administration of 1969–
1974, the country experienced a brief economic “miracle,” growing at more than 11 
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percent over a four-year period, and enabling stabilization of the budget.46 Later, Ernesto 
Geisel, represented the turning point of political liberalization, as he began mediating a 
slow and controlled exit to protect the military from political repercussions later.47 In 
1984, the Brazilian Democratic Movement party gained a majority in the legislatures of 
the two most important states of Rio and São Paulo, propelling the nation to its first 
directly elected presidential victory in twenty years. 
B. RE-DEMOCRATIZATION 1985 TO THE PRESENT 
In 1985 and 1986 Brazil experienced significant growth, in the range of 7 percent 
to 8 percent annually; however, it did not last as inflation and currency devaluation lead 
to financial collapse.48 José Sarney became the first president inaugurated following the 
untimely illness and death of Tancredo Neves just prior to his planned inauguration on 
March 14 of 1985. Sarney would go on to oversee the completion of a new constitution in 
1988. The document, although completed, demonstrated a number of problems, despite 
its lengthy 250 articles.  
The next president, Fernando Collor de Mello, the first directly elected president 
since the early 1960s, thrived politically on an image of strong anticorruption rhetoric; 
however, it proved to be his ironic undoing. The Senate impeached Collor in 1992 
following the revelation that his campaign finance manager secured support through 
bribes in the lead up to Collor’s second term. Prior to the Senate’s final decision, Collor 
demonstrated an oft-used political maneuver to step down from office to avoid political 
sanctions, but the impeachment proceedings continued, resulting in the suspension of his 
rights to run for political office for eight years. Following the impeachment, he was 
further implicated in a separate money-laundering scheme with ten members of congress.  
The 1980s and early 90s were very difficult economically for the young 
democracy, inflation accumulated to 13.3 trillion percent by 1994 and the nation 
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defaulted three times on its debt.49 Prior to being elected president, Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso rose to prominence on the basis of his Real Plan, which he instituted as Finance 
Minister. The program invigorated the economy with a new currency and slashed 
inflation. The plan was remarkably successful, considering multiple new currencies were 
previously unsuccessful. With good policy application, inflation dropped from 5,000 
percent in 1994 to just 1.7 percent in 1998.50 He went on as president to work with 
congress to institute neoliberal reforms in politics, the economy, and the social 
environment. Cardoso’s election represented a new era of political stability in which only 
three presidents held the office during a twenty year period.51  
Waiting in the wings of democracy was Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, the outspoken 
union leader during the military years and a founding member of the new Workers Party 
(PT). Lula lost in three presidential elections before softening the extreme socialist image 
of his party to win in 2002.52 Lula rose to power as a socialist; however, once in office, he 
was more of a centrist and by his second term had garnered broad coalitional support in the 
congress. He retained or modified several of Cardoso’s successful policies, capitalizing on 
good financial times, aided by his own good policies, and focused on extensive social 
reforms. The most notable of those was the Bolsa Familia, which is highly touted for its 
success at bringing approximately 40 million Brazilians out of extreme poverty. Nearing 
the end of his second term, Lula was able to stave off associations with the mensalão vote-
buying scandal that broke open in 2005, but the scandal consumed the two leading 
candidates perceived to be his successor. He then leaned on a close friend, Dilma Rousseff, 
his Chief of Staff and former president of the state-run oil firm, Petrobras. 
Rousseff won the 2010 election and continued to fight against the growing 
perception of corruption in the PT and coalition parties. She sacked seven ministers in her 
first year and pushed for multiple new anticorruption laws following the guilty verdicts in 
the mensalão case. Rousseff struggled to keep the economy growing, and inflation began to 
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rise. Before the end of her first term, the economy stagnated right as the world was turning 
their attention to Brazil, to see what Lula declared as a “first-class country” when he 
lobbied for the opportunity to host the World Cup and the Summer Olympic Games.53 
Complicating the situation, public disappointment burst into uncharacteristically large 
protests around the country in June of 2013. It started as an objection to public transit fare 
increases, but boiled over into protests against the government, education, welfare, 
corruption, and the like. News of a new scandal at Petrobras emerged just before the 2014 
elections, but it was still unknown how big it was until after Rousseff’s win. She survived 
the election but not her second term. She was removed by the Senate for taking out R$58.7 
billion in unauthorized loans from Brazil’s state banks without the approval of congress, an 
impeachable offense under the Fiscal Responsibility Law established in 2000.54 The 
contrived maneuver was intended to deceive voters and other institutions into believing the 
nation’s balance sheet had a better bottom line than in reality. Figure 3 illustrates the 
dramatic change in the Brazilian budget leading into Roussef’s second term.  
Figure 3.  Brazil’s Government Budget Deficit55 
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C. CORRUPTION, A LINGERING LEGACY 
Brazil stands as an example that free elections and a constitution are no panacea 
for some of the challenges that face developing nations. Alfred Montero states, 
“clientelism has survived because of the weakness of electoral and legal forms of elite 
accountability coupled with persisting social and economic inequalities.”56 Brazil’s 
history, gives some small sense of the repetitive challenges good governance faces in this 
country. On top of those issues there are other complicating factors like racial and gender 
inequalities, tremendous income maldistribution and the inefficient spread of social 
benefits. Lack of competitiveness, poor infrastructure, transportation, technology, and 
untrained labor play a significant role in defining Brazilian priorities for reform. Despite 
these challenges, policy makers often divert their attention to other political 
opportunities, where clientelism paces every stage of policymaking, and where nepotism 
and favoritism enriches a select few. Democracy is hindered, as former President Cardoso 
stated, by a tolerance of “corporatism, privileges, and clientelism.”57  
Impunity in Brazil has proven to be another enduring challenge. The historical 
consequences for a politician accused of wrongdoing in Brazil are void of serious 
repercussions. President Collor, was impeached, losing his right to run for office for eight 
years, but returned to politics as of 2017 was serving as a senator. In 1994, a budget 
scandal resulted in the expulsion of implicated legislators, but none went to jail. In 2001, 
the president of the Chamber of deputies resigned over extortion charges, but again 
remained free. According to Timothy Power, “these Brasilia centered scandals are only 
the tip of the iceberg,” and the subnational level is just as corrupt and a springboard to 
more serious activities at the national level.58 What is critical to the reality of impunity in 
Brazil is that the ultimate decision results in “meaningless outcomes” that do little to 
coerce politicians to change.59 The following short narratives of the mensalão and 
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Petrobras scandals demonstrate a new era of hope and anticorruption in Brazil, where the 
rules have changed and the elite are increasingly subject to the rule of law. 
1. Mensalão  
The Mensalão, or big monthly allowance, emerged from a network within Lula’s 
Workers Party that managed an array of budgetary transactions to siphon off millions of 
Brazilian reais in a cash-for-votes operation. After Lula’s election, he decided to load his 
cabinet and key assignments with PT party loyalists, forgoing Cardoso’s method of 
spreading the good jobs among coalition parties. By the end of his second term, 21 of the 
35 cabinet posts were held by PT members and the remaining seats were split between 
eight other parties, of which he was generous only to the independents with five seats.60 
The mensalão payments were used as a bargaining tactic to maintain coalition loyalty. 
The monthly stipend was worth approximately R$30,000.61 News of the scheme broke 
out in 2004 when Roberto Jefferson, a disgruntled coalition deputy from the PTB 
(Brazilian Labor Party), leaked the scheme’s details after the coalition failed to protect 
him from allegations in a separate kickback scheme.62 
As delays and government interference caused the final decision to drag on, the 
Brazilian public looked on in disappointment, knowing that the judiciary could “decide 
whether impunity and all its associated ills—disregard for the law, and citizen cynicism, 
among the most grievous—will persist.”63 Finally, in October of 2012, after seven years 
of deliberation, 25 defendants, including 12 senior leaders in the Workers Party, were 
convicted of crimes including “misappropriation of public funds, mismanagement, 
money laundering, inter-party corruption, bribery (active corruption), and tax evasion.”64 
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Judge Celso de Mello, a supreme court judge, concluded, it was “one of the most 
shameful chapters in the country’s political history.”65  
2. Petrobras 
Not long after the mensalão moved the headlines, the lava jato scheme was 
played out through the state-run oil giant Petrobras in conjunction with government 
officials and construction firms. According to the Brazilian public prosecutors (MP), oil 
executives accepted bribes from a coalition of Brazil’s largest building firms attempting 
to win government contracts.66 Petrobras employees would then negotiate the deal with 
government officials, at which point the contract costs swelled with the expectation that 
the extra funds would circulate back to Petrobras, the politicians, and their political 
parties.  
The scandal received its name, lava jato or car wash, in 2014 after federal police 
inadvertently caught Alberto Youssef, in a recorded phone conversation with another 
individual under surveillance at a run-down car wash. Youssef already had a criminal 
record, and so the police began to investigate him as well. After Youssef linked the 
suspicious purchase of a Range Rover to a senior official at Petrobras, the lava jato 
investigation was opened. Before Youssef spoke to his lawyers, he warned: “If I speak, 
the republic is going to fall.”67 His plea deal and testimony set off a fire storm. The 
investigations have implicated more than 200 public and private individuals, with 
multiple convictions.68  
Sergio Moro, the same federal judge that gained experience as an assistant in the 
Mensalão case, is leading the lava jato investigations, and his cohort is Deltan Dallagnol, 
the lead prosecutor and Harvard law graduate. The extent of the scheme demoralized the 
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Brazilian public in the run-up to the Olympics, an event that in itself exacerbated the 
publics patience with government spending priorities. The lava jato case is the nation’s 
most extensive scandal to date. As of January 2017, approximately 50 politicians are 
accused of illicit connections to the scheme, but perhaps more alarming is that of Brazil’s 
six living presidents only Cardoso has not been accused of ties to the scandal or in 
Rousseff’s case having interfered in the inquiries.69 
D. SUMMARY 
Brazil’s history provides some clues in understanding why corruption is a deep-
rooted problem. Democracy has been intermittent and remains confronted by hereditary 
patronage, nepotism, and privileged elite that are unwilling to place the needs of the 
country above personal gains. Democratic change is a gradual process that strengthens 
over time. This chapter demonstrates that Brazil is still adapting to democracy as a 
cultural identity, and that the nation is making significant strides to reinforce good 
governance. This chapter stops short of suggesting that the Brazilian system has arrived, 
but rather points to the mensalão as a historical turning point, where a series of changes 
culminated in a new era of anticorruption. The mensalão was a stepping-stone and the 
petrolão case is an even broader demonstration of the nation’s capacity. The following 
chapters observe the contributing factors that enabled the anticorruption successes of the 
Mensalão and lava jato.  
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III. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
This chapter demonstrates how it was more than recent changes in 
democratization that enabled the current spring of anticorruption success in the Brazilian 
courts. The Brazilian political system today has developed a system of layered checks 
and balances; some of these transparency and anticorruption mechanisms predated the 
1988 constitution, while others were added incrementally with the new constitution and 
since. The presence of such institutions, procedures, and laws does not, however, 
necessarily translate into transparency and good governance. As has been demonstrated 
in many societies, if the architects of such mechanisms lack proper incentives, like public 
accountability or procedures for accountability and oversight then the result is often 
superficial and lacks effective punitive and preventative mechanisms. This chapter 
demonstrates through a review of competing theories on democratic consolidation and an 
evaluation of Brazil’s rapidly expanding anticorruption efforts, that Brazil has iteratively 
established multiple top down institutional layers of accountability. 
As states adopt and institute democratic principles, it is expected that they can 
develop stability, peace, and prosperity; however, those goals, although common, do not 
arrive all at once or uniformly throughout state development. On the other hand, as 
democracies like Brazil are developing structural rigidity for their political institutions, 
the door is left open for informal institutions and under the table deals to accomplish 
what otherwise is economically or structurally unreasonable. In Brazil these informal 
institutions are a common part of daily interactions; so much so, that they are universally 
referred to as the jeito Brasileiro, or the Brazilian way. Brazil has struggled with 
accountability and effective enforcement mechanisms. There is an old saying in Brazil, 
“aos amigos, tudo, aos inimigos a lei” meaning “for our friends anything, but for our 
enemies the law.” Brazil’s legal, governmental, and employment systems are inherently 
complicated by layers of red tape and minutia, making them prohibitive for many to 
navigate and certainly understand. With such challenges, the environment engenders and 
at times permits the generous application of the Brazilian “jeito” where oversight is 
lacking or masquerades as decorative institutional window dressing. The jeito provides 
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those “in the know” an informal coping mechanism used to circumnavigate 
administrative layers with the assistance of an expert, provided there is a compensatory 
side payment.  
A. DEMOCRATIZATION THEORY 
The first section of this chapter provides a summary of democratization theories 
and their potential application to Brazil’s development since the 1985 turnover from 
military rule to open democracy. These themes demonstrate an array of developmental 
theories, including the impact of domestic approval, structural development, and 
institutional normalization on democratic consolidation.  
1. Trust and Counter-majoritarian Empowerment Theory70 
Despite the tendency of politicians to create policies that they and the public will 
often circumvent, the administrative over-watch institutions have over time demonstrated 
the capacity for institutional learning, and have grown to be more than just window 
dressing. One of the consequent effects of real democratization is empowerment of the 
judiciary and other non-elected institutions of accountability. Fernando Filgueiras 
contends that “the judicialization of politics is the result of a shift in core issues regarding 
democratic legitimacy, both in the sphere of institution building as well as political 
culture.”71 He also explains that public trust is fundamental to the effectiveness of the 
system. Where trust is low, legitimacy is also low, which is the impetus for institutional 
change: “the convergence of these two phenomena entails transformations in political 
representation, and in particular, it allows for the strengthening of counter-majoritarian 
institutions” or in other words the empowerment of the judiciary.72 A finding by 
Filgueiras suggests that, discontent in Brazil did not lead to judicialization, because the 
umbrella for distrust in Brazil hung over the entire political spectrum, to include the 
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judiciary.73 Public distrust in the government did not appear to change until about the 
time the mensalão proceedings were placed transparently before the country on live 
television. 
2. Individualism Theory 
Another common argument in the consolidation discussion is rooted in the 
political incentives for ruling parties to adopt judicial review and other reform measures 
in the early stages of transition to democracy, especially if public opinion deems the 
judiciary as adequate post transition. Conversely, in a state with a high potential for 
political change due to personalist politics, the system leaves a void for the growth of 
judicial independence. As individuals and fractured alliances grow divided, reliance on 
the courts as a constricting agent against political foes becomes a valuable tool. Similarly, 
when there is a high likelihood of turnover each election cycle “governments will tend to 
restrict de facto judicial independence in countries with party-based electoral systems 
(low degree of individualism), but will act the opposite when the system is based on 
candidates (high degree of individualism).”74 The latter is precisely the situation in 
Brazil: the political system has more than thirty political parties, very low party 
discipline, and a high propensity for personalist politics, which is perpetuated by low 
accountability to the electorate and robust vote buying schemes among the poorer and 
less educated districts. 
3. Balancing Versus Building Theory 
Another important perspective on democratization was offered by Thomas 
Carothers, in his assessment of the “transition paradigm,” he highlights the importance of 
institutional effectiveness in spite of a political class who are “widely perceived as 
corrupt, self-interested, dishonest and not serious about working for their country.”75 He 
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warns that all too often the public grows disaffected despite the appearance of democratic 
norms. He also criticizes the “technocratic efforts” of democratization for focusing on 
“redistribution of state power” over “state-building.”76 Certainly a balance of both 
powers and building state capacity are important and in fact go hand-in-hand, however, 
this chapter demonstrates that without an effective rebalancing of power, Brazil would 
not have been able to break the shackles of a clientelistic and executive dominated 
government to reverse the trend of corruption.  
This rest of this chapter introduces some of the institutions and procedures that 
have played a significant part in the development of institutional accountability and 
enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, attention is given to how these organizations 
have worked together to transform the political environment of endemic corruption in 
Brazil. Sergio Praça and Mathew Taylor stress that the institutions for accountability at 
the federal level in Brazil “have not only acted to constrain political actors but also 
significantly altered and reshaped each other, in incremental fashion.”77 According to 
that statement, the following sections first look at the political challenges of multipartism 
and how Brazilian power politics between the executive and legislative branches have 
evolved to create an environment of accountability for the political elite. Second, 
emphasis is given to the fundamental institutions of Brazilian oversight, how they came 
into being, and what they add to the anticorruption efforts. Finally, these two topics lead 
to a discussion of how the Judiciary has been the beneficiary of gradual empowerment 
through institutional balancing with the other two branches of government.  
B. MULTIPARTISM AND THE CORRUPTION CYCLE 
At the core of Brazilian democratic struggles is its awkward mixture of 
presidential and parliamentary forms of democracy that requires a strategic balance of 
alliances to accomplish any measure of productivity. The system is neither presidential 
nor parliamentary, but shares similarities with both. In doing so, incentives for politicians 
are misaligned and buried under complexities that challenge the enforceability of good 
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governance. It is within this construct that politicians have found the freedom to indulge 
in illicit acts while encircling themselves with likeminded political cronies and business 
associates, collaborating to avoid the various layers of administrative oversight. Within 
the Brazilian system there is a triangulation of mutually-reinforcing characteristics that 
perpetuate personalist politics, clientelism, and patronage, they are imbedded in 
proportional representation, weak partisanship, and the requisite demand for presidential 
coalitions in congress.  
1. Proportional Representation 
Brazil uses a method of open ballot proportional representation to determine how 
many seats a party earns each election cycle. Candidates are chosen not by the votes cast 
for them individually, but by party leadership according to the percentage of the total 
votes the party received from the public.78 Parties pool their lists of congressional 
candidates in an effort to win a percentage of the available congressional seats from each 
state.79 This means that if three parties evenly split the vote in thirds, and there are nine 
congressional seats available, each party receives three seats. The Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal (TSE) currently recognizes thirty-two parties, and each party is permitted to 
submit dozens of names on each ballot. The voter has the choice to choose from the 
lengthy list of names or strategically vote for their preferred party. Ultimately, the voter 
does not directly vote for their preferred candidate but contributes to the overall vote for 
their particular party; the party is then apportioned a commensurate number of seats in 
the congress. After apportionment is assigned, the party then selects from their most 
popular candidates to fill the available seats, a strategy that undercuts the connection 
between the electorate and the appointed party representative allocated to the national 
total of 513 seats in the lower house and 81 in the senate.  
Each state is permitted a minimum of eight representatives and a maximum of 
seventy in the lower house, resulting in vastly disproportionate representation of the less 
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populace states while under representing densely populated states like São Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro. Essentially, the vote is watered down, and favors rural states and populists 
who can sway the rural poor through government handouts and sway party leadership to 
put them at the top of the party ticket. The setup weakens the notion of voter 
accountability, as voters cannot determine whom they are actually voting for. 
Furthermore, it encourages politicians to focus on spreading gifts to populous areas like 
the favela, or slums, where pre-election visits are routinely made. Unfortunately, 
“political organizations in Brazil are typically vacuous, driven by personalist leaders 
focused on the distribution of material rewards for themselves and for their associates, 
with little devotion to programmatic government or even consistent ideology.”80 
2. Multipartism 
Brazilians owe their expansive party system to the early years post military rule, 
when standards were lowered for party establishment in an effort to prevent a single party 
from securing too much control.81 Along with an ever growing list of political parties, the 
current structure makes acquiring a party majority very difficult, if not impossible to 
achieve; however, it also engenders an open market style of politics referred to as 
multipartism. There are minimal limitations on party discipline, as demonstrated by the 
lack of “restrictions on moving among parties, and the existence of few impediments to 
the creation of new parties.”82 In the 2016 congressional elections 28 parties received at 
least one seat in the lower house. There are 32 approved political parties, and there are at 
least a dozen more waiting to be vetted by the TSE.83  
Furthermore, with a lack of party loyalty, politicians and parties alike have 
become adept at following opportunities to stay in politics and in control through 
strategic party hopping when conditions are favorable. As Montero indicated, “from the 
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perspective of sitting deputies, those that were bom de voto were especially likely to 
freewheel for pork, using parties as electoral vehicles by switching to organizations that 
could maximize their re-election and access to patronage.”84 Additionally, as an example 
of weak party loyalty, 105 politicians who won in the 2014 elections as PT members, at 
the state and federal level, left the PT prior to the 2016 elections in the hopes of salvaging 
their careers.85  
3. Coalitional-Presidentialism 
As a developing complement to Brazil’s multipartism, the executive branch has 
evolved and countered what could have been certain government gridlock. While the 
constitution apportioned significant political power to the president, the wide spectrum of 
political parties in congress makes gaining a majority very remote. The president requires 
308 votes in the lower house to amend Brazil’s Constitution. In the early years of the new 
democracy, presidents were met with government gridlock due to their inability to rein in 
support from the many parties. At the time the president relied on medidas provisórias 
(MP), or executive actions, to pass legislation. The MPs were effective, for lack of a 
coalition, and the executive took over the origination of 85 percent of legislation after 
1988, of which 72 percent was approved by the congress between 1988 and 2006.86  
Executive dominance of the legislative function was unsustainable due to the over 
extension of executive authority. Presidential power undermined the house and senate; 
however, when Cardoso was elected the balance of power began to normalize. The 
presidential necessity for allies “who all have their own interests and constituencies to 
please—has led Brazilian presidents to pump vast amounts of pork, patronage, and 
protection into the system.”87 This transference of power and money by the executive is 
referred to as coalition-presidentialism. Table 1 demonstrates how Collor lacked the 
certainty of a coalitional majority in congress and therefore struggled to overcome his 
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lack of support, while Cardoso garnered a broader alliance and achieved important 
democratic changes to the system. 
Table 1.   Participation of Coalition Members within the Collor, Cardoso, and 
Lula Cabinets.88 
 
A critical part of presidential handouts in Brazil is the generous dispersal of some 
120,000 political appointments to alliance constituents, more than any other government 
in the world.89 On top of that is the known but generally undocumented practice of 
spreading financial benefits for votes, an act not just committed by the president, but 
cumulatively is estimated to consume 2–5 percent of Brazil’s annual GDP.90 The 
president’s ability to manage their coalition using these methods has proven fundamental 
to their ability to manage the government. As mentioned in Chapter II, the Lula 
administration subsidized the coalition through the mensalão payments. Some have 
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suggested that Rousseff may have ultimately been undone because of her poor 
management of the coalition that ultimately dissolved and helped to impeach her.91  
C. INSTITUTIONALIZATION  
One of Brazil’s deepest challenges has been the ability to establish good 
governance and institute policies with the necessary incentives to deter corruption among 
those holding power. What is more, is that Brazil has often vacillated between models of 
governance as one faction or individual increases to take hold of power, showering favors 
and benefits to friends and support groups before the next rallies sufficient support to 
start a new coalition of patronage. Brazil has teetered between “a centralization of power 
that gives rise to corruption, and a decentralization that reduces the temptations of 
corruption but also reduces the capacity to govern.”92 According to Alfred Montero, after 
free elections were held in 1985 and a new constitution emerged, “the political system 
seemed to manifest all of the maladies scholars feared.”93 The government remained 
elite-dominated, economic reform was only successful sporadically, and government 
services were minimal in a country of growing disparity. As for good governance, some 
mechanisms were in place but authority and capacity were not inherently granted and 
“where enforcement authority is distributed among various agencies and levels of 
government, no one authority may wield a sufficiently large stick to deter 
wrongdoing.”94 
Despite the inequalities and lack of “accountability,” a word that does not have a 
direct translation in the Portuguese language, politicians still had to be elected and some 
measure of recourse for accountability to the constituency had to be demonstrated. As 
such, government accountability is evidenced not only through free and fair elections, but 
also, the existence of autonomous or semi-autonomous agencies dedicated to the purpose 
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of monitoring and reviewing government power and resources. This responsibility for 
oversight in Brazil is spread out through multiple agencies across all levels of 
government that have, over time, matured into a capable network of accountability 
measures. Some of these agencies preceded the 1988 constitution, while others have 
emerged through institutional necessity. The three pillars of institutional accountability 
are the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), the Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito 
(CPI), and the Controladoria Geral da União, (CGU). 
In Brazil, the leading government agency for audits is the Federal Accounting 
Tribunal (TCU). Its origins predate the constitution. It is the legislative branch’s auditing 
control over the executive; it assesses “program design, sound management, internal 
control mechanisms, and their impact on society.”95 The TCU is a bookkeeping 
organization that investigates cases involving presidential and congressional spending.96 
The TCU is also the primary entity for generating reform proposals as well as punishing 
fiscal wrongdoing. 
Another supplementary process is performed by the Parliamentary Investigative 
Committees (CPI) they were built into the 1988 constitutional mechanisms for oversight. 
CPIs were intended to work alongside the Public Ministry (Ministério Público, MP) to 
investigate and report on possible illegal government activities. The impact of multi-party 
coalitions on the CPI has reduced the effectiveness of CPIs and diluted their intended 
purpose, “except in cases in which scandal pressures the government to take the 
initiative,” and more frequently, they are used as bargaining chips by opposition 
parties.97  
The Comptroller General of the Union (CGU) is the watchdog organization for 
the executive branch and all of its subordinate organizations, it was established in 2001. 
The CGU is responsible for “auditing, transparency and anti-corruption, public servants, 
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and ombudsman’s office.”98 The CGU focuses primarily at the state and municipal 
levels, and facilitates transparency by periodically publishing information acquired 
through routine audits, bridging both national and sub-national governments. Since its 
inception, the CGU has been an important part in the anticorruption effort by spotlighting 
the official misuses of tax payer money. Accordingly, the CGU removed more than 500 
government workers in 2016, of which 65 percent were removed on the grounds of 
corruption.99 Following the extensive corruption revelations associated to the lava jato 
and the impeachment of President Rousseff, her successor, Michael Temer, made an act 
of government cleansing, replacing the CGU in May of 2016 with the Ministry for 
Transparency, Monitoring and Control (Ministério da Transparência, fiscalização e 
Controladoria-geral MTMC).  
D. JUDICIALIZATION 
The final building block of democratic consolidation is judicial empowerment. 
The Judiciary is one of the fundamental pillars of oversight and accountability; however, 
to be effective, the judicial system must have the power and autonomy to interpret and 
enforce the rule of law. According to Matthew Taylor, punishing political misconduct is 
essential for two main reasons; it has a “punitive effect on implicated politicians and a 
deterrent effect on their colleagues.”100 Historically, however, the judicial system has not 
been able to achieve such a culture of accountability, instead “officials were able to shrug 
off corruption investigations by relying on a lenient justice system, a weak congressional 
ethics committee, and a public that seemed inured to graft.”101  
The courts are inherently reactive due to the complicated and burdensome nature 
of judicial code and the lingering perception that the courts are subordinate to the 
executive. As such, the courts have demonstrated weak accountability and the same 
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susceptibility to bribes and scandal as the other branches of government. As a result of 
this lack of judicial effectiveness, the courts have an inconsistent record against 
corruption, and until the decisions in the mensalão case it had no impact on seated 
politicians. It was common place for a politician to avoid jail time by relinquishing their 
position, even if convicted of a crime.102  
1. The Courts and Prosecutorial Framework 
Now, having explored some of Brazil’s institutional weaknesses, this section turns 
to explore the judiciary and some of the important changes that have occurred from the 
mensalão and lava jato cases. These examples demonstrate how institutional learning 
helped enable the empowerment of the judiciary against corruption. This section first 
looks at an overview of the Judicial framework that works to combat corruption, followed 
by a review of judicial and legal decisions that have helped to empower Brazil’s 
judiciary. 
At the federal level there are two primary courts, the Supreme Federal Tribunal 
(STF), the highest court of appeal much like the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Superior 
Justice Tribunal (STJ), which acts as the superior appeals court. One of the primary 
challenges for the Brazilian judiciary is the extensive work load, the average judge sees 
more than 5,000 cases which causes the courts to operate at a “glacial pace,” furthermore, 
“decisions can take years to be rendered and then spend years more on appeal.”103 The 
STF cannot control what issues it reviews, but rather must review all cases presented. 
Additionally, legal precedent does not function like in the United States, where a decision 
can be made based on the decisions of previous court rulings. Therefore, the Brazilian 
system requires that a judge make a thorough review and decision on all cases even upon 
seemingly routine charges. 
The Public Ministry (MP), or public prosecutor, was created as part of the 1988 
constitution, and is a semi-autonomous law enforcement agency in the Brazilian 
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government. The MP in Brazil has prosecutors at both the federal and state levels, and 
directs oversight and investigative functions autonomously from other state agencies that 
may be suspected of internal corruption. Becoming a public prosecutor is a prestigious 
but rigorous task that can include a year of tests and interviews with a very small chance 
of accession.104 The Federal Police are complementary to the MP, providing a policing 
arm for the judiciary and can facilitate overt arrests or even covert activities such as 
wiretappings. 
Another important element in Brazil’s anticorruption scaffolding is the electoral 
courts, the highest is the previously mentioned Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and the 
lower is the Regional Electoral Tribunal (RTE). The electoral courts are responsible for 
managing candidate lists and monitoring campaign spending. They are also responsible 
for adjudicating electoral misconduct, and have emerged as an important prevention 
mechanism in the cycle of impunity.  
2. Judicial Empowerment 
Brazil is in the middle of what appears to be a cultural shift; the mensalão case 
has not only elevated “the profile of the country’s STF to an anti-corruption agent in the 
eyes of the public” but it has also empowered the entire system and the people of Brazil 
to look differently upon the corrupt politicians and their negative impact on the nation.105 
This was evident in an interview with the head of the Federal Police who, following the 
arrest of former President Lula, explained that even though the Federal Police are 
subordinate to the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, it is his 
organization’s responsibility to “investigate facts, not people,” and “where those facts 
take us is a consequence of the investigation itself, as painful as it may be.”106 This 
stands as a particularly high point demonstration of the level of institutional and perhaps 
cultural reform that has taken hold in Brazil, validating a paradigm shift away from 
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clientelism and the willingness of individuals to act indiscriminately in favor of sound 
laws and justice.  
3. Plea Bargaining 
Perhaps the most crucial piece of legislation in Brazil’s anticorruption arsenal was 
the adoption of plea bargaining as a part of the Organized Crime Law that was hastily 
pushed forward in the aftermath of the 2013 protests around the country. The law not 
only defined organized crime but also established the means to prosecute its 
perpetrators.107 Implicated personnel are being arrested and allowed to fester on their 
actions in some of Brazil’s most feared jails. When they emerge, many are more than 
willing to accept a plea deal to rat out their cohorts. Provided the prosecutors can validate 
the details of the allegations the defendant can receive a much reduced sentence.  
The timely implementation of the new organized crime law enabled the lava jato 
prosecutors in November of 2014 to begin hearing the first plea bargaining testimony 
associated with the Petrobras scandal. Two years later, the lava jato case had expanded to 
37 separate search and seizure operations to expose deeper layers of the Petrobras crime 
ring. The continued investigations and prosecutions have resulted in the sentencing of at 
least 53, including federal deputies, senators and governors, with dozens more under 
investigation.108 
4. Ending the Appeals Loophole  
One year after the mensalão verdicts, not one of the twenty-five convicted were in 
jail, and the mensalão case was already pushed to the STF twice. While this delay tactic 
was short lived in the case of the mensalão, it may represent one of the last times the elite 
were able to use a classic loophole to keep themselves out of jail. That loophole was the 
process of employing expensive lawyers to conjure up a myriad of excuses to incessantly 
return their defendants case to the appeals courts and delay convictions for years. In 
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September of 2013 the attempt was no different, the purpose of these appeals was over 
the length of prison sentences and the specific kind of sentences.109 It resulted in a few of 
the earlier decisions being reduced, but those convicted began their sentences within a 
few weeks.  
In October of 2016, the STF convened a hearing to consider the end of the 
incessant appeals process, concluding in a six to five vote that would curtail the abuse of 
the legal loophole.110 The decision clarified that the defendant retains the right to appeal, 
but, upon a second confirmation of the original guilty decision, the appellate court can 
close the case and order the defendant to prison. This decision has multiple implications 
on the Brazilian judiciary, most notably for this discussion, it speeds up the process of 
convicting criminals, and greatly alleviates the workload on the courts.  
5. Clean Records Law 
Since 2001, the Parliamentary Investigative Committees (CPIs) and state and 
municipal auditors from the CGU have investigated official malfeasance and where 
necessary notified public ministers, however, these actions did little to impede corrupt 
politicians.111 In June of 2010, however, the congress passed the Clean Record Law (Lei 
Ficha Limpa), which now bars politicians with “dirty records” from running for public 
office.112 This important addition has equipped the TSE and RTE with the authority not 
only to monitor and manage the growing list of corrupt politicians that have been stripped 
of their political office, but also prevent them from running for office, even if they step 
down before formally expulsed from office.  
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E. SUMMARY 
Brazil is currently experiencing a cultural change and empowerment that is 
swelling across all branches of government and the wider bureaucracy. The degree to 
which this movement continues throughout the nation can be seen by taking a small 
sampling of the various events that occurred throughout brazil during November 2016. 
First, former Governor and third place presidential candidate in the 2002 election, 
Anthony Garotinho, was arrested as a part of Operation Chequinho, or little payment. 
Garotinho was responsible for liberally signing up thousands of residents in a conditional 
cash transfer program in order to buy votes to ensure his wife’s mayoral election in 
October 2016.113 During the arrest, he attempted to bribe a federal prosecutor with R$5 
million. Another example comes from the Federal police, when they revealed that they 
had tracked and detained Rodrigo Tacla Duran after emerging from hiding. He was 
seized in Spain with the use of an Interpol arrest warrant, demonstrating state reach and 
international cooperation.114 Duran was a corporate lawyer for Petrobras and is thought 
to be the mastermind behind the scheme that coordinated the elaborate “payment of 
commissions in the awarding of private and public works in Brazil and abroad.”115 
Finally, the Senate approved much needed legislation to stem the tide of ever increasing 
political parties. The legislation applies to deputies and city councils, but demonstrates a 
first step toward constraining the system as a whole. The new law, if approved by the 
lower house, requires a threshold minimum equivalent to 2 percent of the national vote 
beginning in 2018, and would increase to 3 percent in 2022.116 While the stories behind 
the first two examples demonstrate the costly and pervasive nature of corruption in 
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political institutions in Brazil, they each stand as an example of the rapid change that 
continues to unfold throughout Brazil. 
Alfred Montero commended Brazil for its layering “of incremental changes in 
formal and informal rules, norms, and practices that in the aggregate set the stage for 
larger, transformative shifts.”117 The reforms that led to the results in the mensalão and 
lava jato operations did not occur over night; rather, they have evolved over time as the 
Brazilian democracy has begun to cut its teeth. The 1988 constitution proved to be “an 
incomplete political and judicial framework for accountability.”118 Yet, legislators, 
persistent judges, and oversight organizations have been able to string together 
institutional powers that have begun to erode political immunity. 
Matthew Taylor said of Brazil’s gains, “we have seen enormous institutional 
gains in Brazil in the last thirty years, enormous legislative gains, in terms of new laws to 
combat corruption. If we could now see the condemnation and removal of the corrupt 
from the political system, Brazil could enter a new positive cycle.”119 Recent evolutions 
in Brazil’s democracy have demonstrated that this new cycle may be opening, and 
although there is still much work to be done and many more corrupt politicians to 
remove, there is reason for confidence in the countries capacity to begin a new era of 
transparency.  
Now, having evaluated the institutional construct of the Brazilian democracy and 
considered the various modifications that have begun to transform its political culture 
there is still an import question left unanswered. The question is why did the political 
class empower the agencies and tools of anticorruption to limit what has proven to be a 
very lucrative occupation for those that know how to manage the system? There are 
several possible answers, however, the first to be eliminated is the ideological aspiration 
that the politicians would either grow a conscience or that enough of the opposition 
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forces would combine to rein in the controlling coalition within the legislature. The first 
is quite simply a bit far-fetched, and the latter unlikely due to the fractured nature of 
Brazilian multipartism. It is however, possible that the ruling parties made notional 
changes knowingly, as a nod to transparency but with the expectation that they would 
never acquire the power and authority to truly make an impact. That then leaves the 
possibility for a ground up argument for social revolution and an outsider argument for 
the influence of international organizations. The next two chapters pursue these further, 
first the social aspect of civil revolt in Chapter IV, and Chapter V evaluates the possible 
implications of exogenous organizations to explain why Brazil is experiencing this 




IV. DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
One of the inherent goals of neoliberal democracy is to not only govern, but to 
govern well as an agent of the people. The idea of good governance assumes that the 
administration provides a stable economy and public services for the people and in return 
the public supports the administration through popular participation. As such, a healthy 
democratic system of governance produces a reinforcing cycle where public officials are 
responsible for managing public policy, the economy, foreign affairs, and the like. The 
degree to which the populace is satisfied with the governing regime, it engenders public 
approval. This reinforcing mechanism then adds to the structural rigidity of a growing or 
stable democracy. So far as the system is held in equilibrium through good governance 
and public satisfaction, the system remains healthy. On the other hand, if the system is 
held together through lesser means, such as coercive authoritarianism or populist 
promises and handouts, then the system is unsound and susceptible to destabilizing 
alternatives such as a coup, usurpation, or revolution. 
An important measure of state development is often gauged in terms of the state’s 
capacity to cultivate institutions and policies that in turn generate a productive working 
environment for domestic growth and commerce. The result of persistent growth and 
increased state capacity lays the foundation for an exponential increase in state capital, 
health and living standards, educational capacity, and overall productivity. Development 
then produces a healthier, happier, more satisfied people, with one important catch; the 
growth mechanisms must be long term and sustainable. The down side for regimes that 
fail to maintain good governance and effective growth is a demanding populace that 
understands the good times are at an end, and someone must be to blame.  
This chapter presents the context for Brazil’s social development and how the 
people have turned their circumstance into political leverage in the form of social 
accountability. As a result of the exponential growth rates and social improvements for 
the middle class, the environment continues to change, particularly the demand for 
government productivity as a return on public investment. This new environment, for the 
time being, appears to be more demanding of the elected leadership and certainly less 
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forgiving. This chapter looks to the protests of June 2013, as the flashpoint for change. It 
was the 20-cent fare increase that sparked a bevy of complaints and three years of 
uncharacteristic social activism that ended with a presidential impeachment and reforms 
that ultimately empowered the judiciary. 
A. ACTIVISM THEORY 
This section introduces some of the leading arguments in relation to state 
development and social movements. There are a variety of discussions and potential 
applications, some with more broad and lasting consequences, while others are less 
developed. Particularly important to understand in the nature of this discussion is the 
fluid environment in Brazil, and the means by which these arguments are and may 
continue to be contested. Multiple theories are presented and reviewed; however, the 
complexity of the social environment likely remains incompletely appreciated in the 
near-term.  
1. Development Theory 
Many theorists agree that civic activism is often a byproduct of state 
development, arguing that as a state grows and expands its economy and the state’s 
ability to provide for the basic needs of its people, social reforms and services often 
empower a growing middle class. A successful democracy is dependent upon government 
officials being accountable to the citizenry. On the contrary, where there is limited 
accountability and limited capacity for the populace to punish politicians at the ballot 
box, there is little incentive for officials to apply legal restraints on their own corrupt 
practices. Not only must there be popular support among a segment of the population, but 
there must be additional motivations for the governing party to “cede real power and 
resources to the citizenry” or other institutions for that matter.120 
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Thomas Carothers argues that without real public participation, democracy is not 
effectual.121 He further elaborates that recurring elections are not a sufficient measure of 
political participation. Recurring elections are of negligible importance without political 
freedom, government legitimacy, deepening political participation, and democratic 
accountability.122 Latin America in general is beset by hundreds of years of poor 
institutional performance, government accountability and wide economic disparity. 
Carothers points out that “the wide gulf between political elites and citizens in many of 
these countries turns out to be rooted in structural conditions, such as the concentration of 
wealth or certain sociocultural traditions that elections themselves do not overcome.”123 
Brazil’s popular participation is often misinterpreted as robust based on voter 
participation, yet these reports do not always acknowledge that Brazil has compulsory 
voting laws for literate individuals between the ages of 18 and 70.124 Although the legal 
consequences are minor, compulsory voting inflates the appearance of popular support 
and the notion of good governance. 
Building upon the development theory, it is worth noting there are many studies 
on civic activism and factors that drive mobilization. Robert Bonifacio and Rafael 
Paulino identified in their study of Latin America that the most prevalent factor that 
increased political participation was increased education, declaring; “schooling always 
raises the propensity to participate.”125 Barbara Geddes takes this suggestion one step 
further, suggesting that “increasing education, equality, urbanization, experience of 
working in factories, and the weakening of traditional loyalties to tribe and village—all 
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correlates of economic development-would result in citizens with more tolerant and 
participatory attitudes who would demand a say in government.”126  
2. Government Legitimacy Theory 
According to Paul Collier, “states need a critical mass of educated people in order 
to work out and implement a reform strategy,” thus incentivizing the government to 
produce more productive social capital.127 The state produces social capital through 
educational, health, and social improvements. The relationship between the state and the 
citizen then becomes a crucial indicator of state legitimacy and a measure of political 
restraint. Samuel Huntington warned that a state’s “sustained inability to provide welfare, 
prosperity, equity, justice, domestic order, or external security could over time undermine 
the legitimacy” of democratic governments.128 He further cautioned, that like earlier 
waves of democratization around the globe, loss of legitimacy in late democratizing 
states leaves them susceptible to democratic reversal.  
If corruption is a mechanism of weak institutional capacity, then democratic 
stability is critical to enduring democracies. Huntington argues that there were several 
weaknesses shared among states that backtracked away from democracy into 
authoritarian or leftist regimes. He listed seven notable challenges: weak democratic 
values among the elite, severe economic setbacks, social and political polarization, 
exclusion of populist and leftist movements, breakdown of law and order, foreign 
intervention, and “reverse snowballing” or regressing away from democracy.129 
Historically, when Brazil’s political and economic systems fail to provide for the nation’s 
growing needs, the military has stepped in to moderate. Nevertheless, given that 
democratic processes have made it this far without intervention, it suggests that 
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democratization may have reached a level of effectiveness to prevent such a reversal, 
despite popular dissent. 
3. Transparency Theory 
Another important theory in the anticorruption toolset is the transparency 
argument that rests on the availability of information accessible to the public. Not just 
government released information, but also the unwanted information divulged through 
media sources. It is widely accepted that the availability of information regarding 
government activities encourages good conduct and can produce social change if public 
perception is otherwise. With that same understanding, there are important factors that 
can dramatically impact the effect of transparent information. Eliza Katzarova states that 
public information is especially useful when the citizens are not only discerning of the 
information, but also - and perhaps more importantly – willing to “take on the role of 
public regulators.”130 This down flow of information is generally made available first by 
the governing body, and then through the media. Important to the effectiveness of 
transparency mechanisms is the ability to apply pressure on the government to produce 
unfiltered information and then for the media and the public to effectively interpret the 
meaning of the available information.131  
Furthermore, for transparency to be effectual information must be widely 
available and perceived as accurate; incidentally, the government generally has control of 
both of these qualifiers. The 1990s initiated a new era of anticorruption around the world, 
it produced a number of high profile discussions and crusades to eradicate international 
and domestic bribery, rent-seeking, and gains taking at the expense of an unknowing 
public. The media became a critical part of what Moises Naim labeled the “corruption 
eruption.”132 With every new revelation of misdeeds the public watched in dismay and 
curiosity, demanding answers and fixes and the media acted as the filter and expositor of 
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the untold truth. The world’s new affinity for transparency also resulted in an increased 
awareness of corruption and a higher propensity for whistleblowing and adoption of 
transparency mechanisms.  
Today social media adds a new dynamic to public information and social 
activism. Social media embodies the information age, but also magnifies media 
availability through personalized networks of homogenous ideological groupings. Social 
media enables individuals to connect and share ideas through the many growing webs of 
connectivity where information is gathered, interpreted, and personalized in real time and 
spread like wildfire around the globe in an instant.  
The availability of information to a judicious public facilitates public 
accountability. The media effect on government transparency depends on the strength of 
the institution and the incentives to change. Low-impact transparency is top-down 
dissemination, where the government cherry picks the quantity and quality of the 
information distributed. Alternatively, high-impact transparency is produced from the 
bottom-up, where the public through social activism drives an agenda of reform and 
transparency. One limiting downside to high-impact transparency is the reliance on third 
parties to equitably respond and interpret available information. Ultimately, it remains 
that only the citizen is capable of fact checking the fact checkers to avoid being 
misled.133  
B. THE BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s, Brazil struggled with economic disparity and 
prolonged state-led import substitution and industrialization programs, causing 
hyperinflation and recession. Brazil’s favelas (shantytowns) ballooned with families 
living below or near the poverty line. In the mid-1990s however, Brazil began to 
liberalize, introducing open market reforms that put it on a path of economic turnaround. 
The primary architect of the reversal was the finance minister turned president, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso under the Real Plan. As president, he continued to add liberalization 
and free market policies that enabled the economy to surge at the right time. The world 
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was growing, East Asia in particular, driving a global commodity boom. Brazil was able 
to harness some of the untapped capital and resources of the world’s fifth largest country, 
and one of the most richly endowed. This new era of liberalization ushered in great hope 
and expectations for a country that has frequently flirted with prosperity, but has often 
fallen short. The tremendous growth enabled expansion of social reforms that catapulted 
millions from poverty into contributing social capital. Figure 4 illustrates Brazil’s growth 
in the early 2000s before stagnating after 2010.  
Figure 4.  Brazil’s Economic Stagnation.134 
 
1. Social Welfare 
At the turn of the century, Brazil had stabilized and had begun to implement 
social policies to alleviate the inordinate number of extremely poor scattered on the 
periphery of big cities and especially the north and northeastern states. Cardoso’s 
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programs were experimental, targeted at issues effecting the poorest of society. The Bolsa 
Escola (education grant), was a conditional program targeted at encouraging the poor 
communities to attended school. Another was Auxilio Gas (gas assistance), intended to 
ensure the poor could still get cooking fuel after state subsidies were discontinued. The 
results of these programs were limited but well intended. Cardoso’s second term election 
competition would be his successor, Lula Inacio da Silva who was and is the figurehead 
of the socialist PT. Lula, a former union worker and ‘every man,’ promised more social 
reforms that would reach farther than the previous administrations. The PT experimented 
with a few options with little success; the complexities of the nation’s needs and its 
available resources pushed Lula to rethink the application of these programs. Lula settled 
on a new strategy that would combine what worked from the Cardoso period with his 
own Cartão Alimentação (food card) under one system. The result was the Programa 
Bolsa Família (PBF, Family Grant Program), it “pooled four distinct cash-transfer 
programs (education, cooking gas, nutrition, and anti-hunger)” into one program that 
could be adapted to the needs of any family.135  
Lula’s commitment to the Bolsa Família gave immediate assistance to Brazil’s 
poorest families while also making an investment in the nation’s future. The conditional-
cash-transfer program was created in just a way to help lift but not to the point it might 
encourage an individual to stop seeking employment. A qualifying recipient must have an 
income below approximately R$76, and receives a cash transfer via bankcard for an 
amount between R$22 and R$306 reais per month based on income and the number of 
children.136 The bankcard and funds are strategically allocated to the mother, since many 
households in Brazil are managed by single parent mothers, and they are more likely to 
use the money judiciously.137  
In order for a family to qualify for a month’s stipend, it is required that the 
children, ages six to seventeen, must attend a minimum of 85 percent of their classes, and 
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the children must also receive routine medical checks and mandatory vaccines.138 By 
enforcing these standards, the program reinforces the importance of education and 
bolsters school attendance for the poor who otherwise have low incentive to attend and 
might more easily find themselves caught up in unfavorable social networks that 
perpetuate the poverty cycle rather than improve it. Additionally, the medical checks 
ensure access to routine care and vaccines that have had profound effect on infant and 
youth mortality rates. 
The long term impacts of the Bolsa Família are promising, approximately twelve 
million families receive funds annually for basic subsistence, while children benefit from 
better health and an education that supports their family and bolsters the Brazilian 
economy for the future.139 The impact of the program is estimated to have alleviated 
more than forty million Brazilians from extreme poverty, a number that continues to 
grow.140 One of the exceptional qualities of the program is its very low impact on a 
highly burdened national budget. The annual cost of the Bolsa Família hovers around 0.4 
percent of GDP, making it a very low cost high reward program.141 Not only has the 
program brought wide success in Brazil, but it has also set the standard for social welfare 
programs around the globe.  
2. Education  
Looking beyond the Bolsa Família’s objective to alleviate poverty, the program 
boasts a much more robust package of benefits to the state than what it costs in operate. By 
applying a small amount of money into livelihood, health and education, Brazil has 
amplified the output of its human capital. Studies confirm that after nearly two decades of 
social welfare injections, the average workers education has expanded from approximately 
6.1 years of schooling in 1995 to nine years in 2012, with most of that increase coming 
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from the last half decade.142 Furthermore, in the northeast of Brazil, the area with the most 
wide spread poverty, the program created an influx of children into the schools and 
overwhelmed an under-funded segment of Brazil’s hidden potential. As a result, the 
government had to address the disproportionate wages and low quality of schools in the 
region. 
There is much praise that can be given for the successes, present and future, that 
should be attributed to the Bolsa Família; however, the clientelistic nature of the program 
should not be overlooked, particularly in consideration of the impacts the program has had 
on the country. In addition to the impact on social improvement, Lula’s policies aimed at 
poverty elimination have likely played a significant role in generating voter loyalty. It 
should also be noted the design of the program is such that the responsibility for 
distribution of funds is decentralized, propagating the role of benefactor to the municipal 
level. In a country with compulsory voting laws and an enormous base of low-income 
beneficiaries, the program likely played a significant role in Lula’s “rock star” like 
favorability, and floated the party’s longevity through President Rouseff’s reelection in 
2014.143  
C. RISING EXPECTATIONS 
Francis Fukuyama and Sanjay Marwah argued that institutional effectiveness is 
central to the equation of progress, and that during development institutional 
administrators must not only be highly competent, but also “free of any personal 
corruption.”144 They further maintain that one of the primary factors for instability in 
Brazil, and most Latin American countries, is due to the unequal distribution of 
mechanisms for growth, which resulted in a “narrow, well-educated elite at the top of 
society but has left a large majority of the population either as impoverished rural 
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peasants or as an urban underclass.”145 As demonstrated through the Bolsa Família, that 
dynamic is beginning to change. Provided that the state can make enduring institutional 
reforms for progress and reduce inequality it inherently produces a more productive 
society in dimensions of health, education, and productivity which in turn develops a 
broader middle class.  
Latin America, by inheritance, is plagued by a history of strong centralized 
governments and state-directed economies, which traditionally have not incentivized the 
ruling elite to prioritize institutional effectiveness.146 Nevertheless, in line with the 
activism theories of Geddes and Carothers, Brazil’s socio-economic transformation may 
be rendering its most important dividends in the form of citizen accountability. 
According to an annual survey conducted by Brazil’s National Confederation of Industry 
(CNI), corruption is the biggest problem affecting the country, and has been climbing the 
priority list every year since the mensalão verdict in 2012.147 This rebirth of 
accountability and voter justice was demonstrated in the 2016 municipal elections, as the 
PT suffered dramatic losses as a part of the lava jato fallout, winning a total of 254 
mayoralties as compared to 635 in 2012.148  
An examination of political transformation in Brazil would be incomplete without 
considering the likelihood of civil demand for military intervention. A common fear 
among neoliberals, when watching unrest in Latin America, is the potential return to 
authoritarian rule, just as Samuel Huntington cautioned. Since redemocratizing, Brazil 
has probably never been closer to that reality than between the Spring of 2015 and 
summer of 2016, when public disgust for the government reached its boiling point and 
millions again gathered in protest across the country. According to data retrieved in the 
AmericasBarometer surveys, respondents exhibited a growing belief that military 
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intervention was justifiable under conditions of extreme corruption. Intervention 
favorability spiked from 36 percent of respondents in 2012 to 47 percent in 2014.149 It is 
worth noting that prior to 2012 the response to this same question was relatively stable; 
however, the change may have been triggered by the down turn in the economy and the 
mensalão trials that concluded in October of 2013. The disturbing trend however is not 
necessarily indicative of the potential for a military coup, but more an expression of 
Brazilian culture and a perception of acceptable alternatives to counter corruption. The 
report also noted that respondents in favor of military intervention was supported nearly 
as much by those in favor of the Rousseff administration as those that opposed it.150 
These findings are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. While the likelihood of military 
intervention remains untested, reports during street protests indicated calls for the 
military remained a minority among the crowds.151 Additionally, it is worth mentioning 
that although Rousseff referred to her impeachment as a coup, the decision was carried 
out democratically in both houses of the congress and there was not any overt 
interference by the military. 





Figure 5.  Percent Who Believe a Military Coup Is Justifiable Under High 
Corruption in Brazil, 2007–2014.152 
 
 
Figure 6.  Percent Who Believe a Military Coup Is Justifiable Under High 
Corruption by Level of Approval of Brazil’s President, 2014.153 
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This section addresses three specific examples of social activism to demonstrate 
how Brazilian frustration with the government and corruption in general eliminated 
passivity and led to progressively stronger social movements. This section also highlights 
the linkages to previously annotated theories, and how they apply in Brazil. The 
importance of the Brazilian public in facilitating an environment of anticorruption should 
not be overlooked. The role of the public in democracy is to apply pressure on politicians 
in pursuit of accountability. Brazilian grievances are fractured, but this section sets out to 
prove that the path to transparency gained momentum through the success of the 
Mensalão, which was further amplified as the economy and government services 
deteriorated under changing economic conditions domestically and globally. Mounting 
discontent for institutional inefficiencies and mismanagement pushed the public beyond 
its limit, and resulted in an emboldened public with that realized it could hold the 
government in check. 
1. Public Consent for Judicial Activism 
One of the earliest examples of public empowerment came in July of 2006 in the 
run up to the elections in Rio de Janeiro. At the time the state elections court of Rio the 
(Tribunal Regional Eleitoral, TRE) took the initiative to cancel the candidacies of all 
politicians with fichas sujas (dirty records).154 The decision was later overturned by the 
higher electoral court, on a technicality in the decision, but not until after the names of all 
the fichas sujas were blasted across local news outlets for weeks. The city took note and 
in a turn of political justice, the public validated the TREs leap of faith, and not one of the 
implicated candidates was elected.  
Although the unconventional wisdom of the TRE was thwarted it was only 
temporary, and in 2010 a national fichas Limpas law (clean records) was created at the 
behest of the public.155 This transitional event stands as evidence in favor of Fernando 
Filgueiras counter-majoritarian empowerment theory presented in Chapter III, which 
argues that public discontent with government leads to empowerment of the judiciary. 
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The TRE was justified by an immediate positive public reaction, reinforcing the idea that 
corrupt politicians may not be able to overcome transparency. This was again validated 
following the mensalão decisions in 2012, as “the verdicts appear to have been generally 
welcomed by Brazilians, particularly judging by responses on social networks where the 
news was met with jubilation and Praise for the STF judges.”156 Interestingly, Public 
distrust in the judiciary was equal to that of the other branches until the decision was 
made to permit Brazil and the world to see the mensalão proceedings on public 
television.  
2. The 20-Cent Revolution 
The motivation for what became known as the vinegar or 20-cent revolution in 
2013 is attributed to public discontent over taxation without representation. Brazilians 
know they pay much higher taxes than most. At approximately 35 percent of GDP it is on 
par with many first world European welfare states, yet, their return on investment does 
not add up.157 Part of this is likely due to the size of the informal economy, yet the point 
remains that a lot of money is going into the system but there is not much to show for it 
and so Brazilians have moved their grievances to the streets. As the World Cup loomed 
on the horizon, Brazilians had the perception that their money was being put into 
stadiums to create a façade to the world while citizens were going hungry. Public 
frustration spiked in June of 2013 in response to a 20-cent hike in bus and subway fares 
in Sao Paulo. After a violent response by police, protests spread, sending millions into the 
streets around the countries major cities and onto the doorstep of the federal capital. As 
the crowds expanded, so did the list of grievances, which included health care, education, 
corruption, and waste, particularly for the World Cup and the Olympics.  
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Public ministers were unable to depart Brasilia, so Rousseff organized urgent 
discussions to address the public complaints and stem the tide of growing frustrations.158 
After about two weeks of public demonstration, Rousseff addressed the public, and in her 
message she listed five urgent issues; fiscal responsibility, political reform, healthcare, 
public transportation and education.159 She stated, “the streets are telling us that the 
country wants quality public services and more efficient mechanisms to combat 
corruption.”160 While the address appeared to be lip service to many, the government 
followed through with its public mandate and pushed through the Organized Crime and 
Clean Companies laws a few months later. Both of these laws soon had a significant 
impact on the lava jato case that was exposed the following year. 
3. Lava Jato 
The 2013 protests became a springboard for further demonstrations. The public 
did not need convincing that their government was corrupt, but in March of 2014 the lava 
jato scheme was discovered, with implications of money laundering organized through 
the state-run oil firm, Petrobras.161 The extent of the Petrobras scandal took time to 
develop as the prosecution weeded through plea deals and layers of bureaucratic 
impediments. Simultaneously, Rousseff’s reelection campaign narrowly succeeded 
before allegations emerged that the Petrobras deals may have financed her campaign. 
Although she achieved reelection, her path was only downhill from there; her approval 
rating sank to 8 percent in August of 2015, her coalition in congress failed, and 
impeachment was being considered.162 
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On Sunday March 13, 2016, approximately 3.4 million Brazilians took to the 
streets again throughout the country; frustrated by the growing lava jato case, 
government waste, and lack of public services. Remarkably, the enormous outpouring of 
emotion and anxiety may have been the largest anticorruption demonstration in 
history.163 This protest, however, was different from Brazil’s earlier ones because the 
public could no longer see a way forward without changes at the top. The protests of 
2013 “were mostly about irrational government spending, [this was] specifically to 
protest official corruption.”164 The results enabled the prosecution with the previously 
mentioned Clean Companies and Organized Crime Laws. With more than 200 defendants 
and serious repercussions for Petrobras as well as Odebrecht, the nation’s largest 
contracting company, the evidence confirms the power of the public to hold politicians 
accountable. 
4. The Media 
Each of the events indicated is a testament to how Brazilian dissatisfaction with 
their government amplified rapidly, but the critical link between each of them was the 
accessibility of media coverage. An important step in making the media shift possible 
took place in 1995. In an effort to liberalize the country, a constitutional amendment was 
approved to open up the state-run telecommunications system to the public.165 Within a 
fifteen-year period of privatization, Brazil’s media penetration expanded from 13 million 
land lines to 43 million and 180 million mobile phones.166 Today, Brazil is the world’s 
fourth largest user per capita of the Internet and third largest user of Facebook.167 These 
demographics are important because they are indicative of the rapid absorption of media 
in a state that had relatively low penetration only two decades ago. It also demonstrates 
the importance of social media in the Brazilian lifestyle. In the previously referenced 
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AmericasBarometer report, the authors revealed that the probability a Brazilian making a 
public protest is most likely if the individual is active in the community, has political 
interest, and is willing to share political information through social media.168 In line with 
Katzarova’s transparency theory, presented earlier, the mixture of public awareness, 
education, and discontent led many Brazilians to take on the trending anticorruption 
initiative. 
As public awareness and discussion of corruption increased, it produced an 
intolerable environment toward illicit and unethical practices by public servants. All who 
cared about their country and the deplorable state of corruption engaged the reality of the 
situation. The effect on Brazilians was transformative; the social acceptability of robust 
waste and self-indulgence was no longer acceptable. Ultimately frustration led to 
networking and speaking out, and speaking out led to acting out, which enabled a 
national movement. Previously, the phrase “roba mas faz” expressed the Brazilian 
acceptance of corrupt politicians who although “crooks” were tolerated because they “got 
things done.” In the future, that phrase may be an ignominious reference to the old ways, 
when political elite could get away with irresponsible behavior.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented several arguments and examples to illustrate the 
conditions under which the Brazilian state could adopt new measures of reform that 
empowered the people to demand accountability and justify judicialization for the 
purpose of balancing democracy. Stopping short of closing the book on Brazilian reform, 
the reality of reform is that it must be enduring, and it begins with the people. Public 
officials lack sufficient motivations to step in front of hundreds of years’ worth of 
patrimonialism and corruption. That being the case, as much as the public must rise up 
and demand reform, the actual power lies in the hands of politicians. It is still early to 
assess the long term impact of what is unfolding in Brazil, yet the changes appear to have 
broad impact and staying power. The public and the judiciary demonstrated the 
willingness and ability to punish corruption through the ballot box and the rule of law. 
                                                 
168 Mosley and Layton, “Prosperity and Protest,” 5. 
 57
Although the judiciary appears to be Brazil’s new moderating force, this chapter was 
intended to demonstrate that it would not have occurred if not for broad public support. 
In short, Brazil has exhibited a productive evolution of state capacity and public 
services; namely the broader education and welfare of the population. The Brazilian 
middle class grew rapidly over a very short period and so did the appetite and the 
demands of an informed people. As the good times deteriorated, “the combustible mix of 
rising unemployment, public frustration, and growing scandals” led to dramatic political 
changes.169 Although this chapter has considered some of the primary internal motives 
for change, Chapter V presents some of the external factors that ultimately prepared the 
nation for reform and applied the pressures to instigate the afore mentioned social 
movement. 
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V. EXOGENOUS FORCES 
It is often said of Brazil, that the country is at a crossroads; it has the potential to 
contribute to global issues and go beyond being a middle power to bridge the gap 
between under developed and developed nations. For nearly a century, Brazil has 
maintained aspirations of achieving parity with contemporary global powers, and by the 
numbers, Brazil is certainly a likely candidate. Brazil is the world’s fifth largest country 
in land mass and population, and as of 2015 was the ninth largest economy in the 
world.170 The reality, however, is much different which is why Harold Trinkunas states 
that “a major power is characterized by more than size, population, and economic 
achievement. It is distinguished by its intentions regarding its role in the international 
system.”171 Trinkunas further suggests that a rising power is identifiable by its ability to 
“successfully participate in shaping the rules and forming the regimes that govern the 
international order.”172  
In its rise to prominence, Brazil has failed to demonstrate sustained socio-
economic success and international clout to achieve its lofty goals. Brazil has 
distinguished itself as a global middle power with the ability to lead within its region and 
on key global initiatives, but with substantial political and economic challenges at home, 
and inconsistent action toward political and economic issues abroad, Brazil’s efforts to 
project itself as a major power have fallen short. Despite these shortcomings, the nation’s 
leaders did not cease to look outward and upward, perhaps reaching its apex during the 
Lula administration, encompassing the years of 2003 to 2010. Due to this outward 
orientation, trying to be a top tier member of the international community, Brazil 
inadvertently invited international influences that eventually changed its domestic affairs 
in a more dramatic fashion than Brazil changed the international agenda. 
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Brazil’s major international projection culminated in its bid to host the 2014 
World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. In the lead up to the world’s two biggest 
international events, Brazil was iteratively primed for a corruption transformation. The 
need for change had been there for centuries and the capacity to do so had a foundation in 
the growing democracy, but the motivation to change was missing its spark. That is until 
the weight of the world’s greatest spectacles were placed upon an overburdened and 
under privileged people. Brazil’s showcase to the world turned into the cataclysmic 
undoing of elite ambitions, and finally ignited the flames of domestic frustration, tipping 
the balance of power in favor of the judiciary in the fight against corruption.  
A. INFLUENCE THEORY 
There are many theories on international relations that focus on addressing the 
need for domestic accountability and how to encourage good governance. This section 
addresses some of the most relevant theories, to include broad international influence 
theory, complex interdependence theory, and international balancing theory. 
1. International Influence Theory 
Serena Verdenicci and Dan Hough argue that there are three basic pillars for 
combating corruption: government self-regulation, citizen accountability, and external 
pressures applied through NGOs and IGOs.173 There are, however, varying opinions 
regarding the application and effectiveness of each of these pillars. One common theme 
that emerges, in response to these criticisms is the concern that external or foreign 
influences may overburden an already weak institution, destabilizing a nations ability to 
self-govern. Katherine Bersch adds that “ambitious reforms aimed at increasing 
transparency and enhancing accountability, paradoxically, can weaken institutions over 
time.”174  
On the contrary, there is the school of thought that contends that international 
organizations and third party watchdog groups are most effective in anticorruption 
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reform, as they are able to investigate and openly publicize the existence of corruption 
and its effects on society. As states interact with global players and seek alliances, trade, 
and investment, they are faced by other states and organizations that are increasingly 
aware of unfair corrupt practices and the devastating impact on populations. As such, 
organizations including the World Bank, IMF, OECD, UN, and the like, have assisted in 
the anticorruption effort by requiring preconditions be met in order for states to receive 
access to aid or association.  
2. Complex Interdependence Theory 
Today’s globalized world generally requires layers of multilateral linkages 
between international players, which elevates the complexity of prior alliances and 
partners to global economic and strategic organizations of interdependence. This modern 
reliance on intermingling with foreign entities exposes domestic ambitions to potentially 
incongruous international incentives. Peter Gourevitch explains that the interdependence 
of states in modern society “severely constrains the freedom of action of governments” 
and can even lead to the reshaping of domestic institutions.175 From the perspective of 
external entities, this is seen as a non-invasive method for shaping domestic policies to 
achieve a certain international objective. On the other hand, for sovereign states, it 
suggests that participation in the international arena comes at a cost to domestic will, 
unless that state has the ability not to take directions but to dictate them.  
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye describe the modern web of political, social, and 
economic international alliances as a “complex interdependence” in which multiple 
actors contribute to a rebalancing of domestic and international powers in which “the line 
between domestic policy and foreign policy becomes blurred.”176 The international 
playing field is, however, dominated by the strong and their agendas, predominantly early 
democratizing liberal capitalist states. The West has dictated the rules of the game for 
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centuries, to the detriment of late comers and their sovereignty. Barbara Geddes argues 
that late democratization was a result of the 1980s debt crisis which forced developing 
nations to adopt capitalist policies in order to attract international investment.177 
Consequently, institutions concerned with the unknown risks associated with providing 
aid to this new diverse group of political and economic institutions drove investors to 
make their aid and loans “conditional on the undertaking of good governance 
reforms.”178 
3. International Balancing Theory 
Contrary to the theories already presented that predominantly suggest that despite 
the loss of sovereignty to international cooperation, the overall impact of interdependence 
is mutually beneficial; Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras contend that the forces of 
interdependence are inherently predatory. They argue that neoliberalism is inherently 
dysfunctional and “profoundly exclusionary” which results in “antisystemic social 
movements.”179 Veltmeyer and Petras go on to question the perceived unpretentious 
nature of IGOs and NGOs when assisting developing nations, suggesting that it is not 
genuine, but rather a method to douse the fires of revolution and “antisystemic 
politics.”180 Accordingly, the agenda of world powers is to use international 
organizations as puppet mediators to protect the status quo and the global social order.  
B. BRAZILIAN GLOBAL IMAGE 
Brazil has been a great power pretender since its creation, it has never been an 
agenda setter or significant factor in global politics. This is historically due to the nation’s 
lack of military power as a tool for managing international disputes. Today, the modern 
international forum is diverse and inclusive of non-military states, giving Brazil and other 
developing nations an alternative path to shaping the international debate. This section 
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introduces some of Brazil’s efforts to propel the nation into international great power 
relevancy.  
Trinkunas states that “a state is recognized as attempting to rise when it seeks 
membership in a major power institution.”181 If great powers were determined primarily 
by their land mass and population size Brazil would be a top tier nation, but when history 
and all of the other indicators of power are brought to bear, Brazil’s influence is limited. 
Juxtaposed against the nation’s great size and potential, it is understandable why the 
nation clings to the hope of being the “land of the future.”182 Using Trinkunas’ statement 
as a measure of Brazil’s upward trajectory, the nation began to signal its perception of 
peer status following the First and Second World Wars. After joining the United States 
and its allies in both campaigns, Brazil actively sought a permanent seat at the table of 
decision makers in the League of Nations and the United Nations Security Council.183 On 
both occasions, some of the major powers did not consider Brazil credible for the 
position and the invitation to become a permanent member of the council was never 
extended.  
Disappointed by the decision, despite American support to the contrary, Brazil 
began to distance itself from the new post-war order, but retained ambitions for inclusion. 
In the post-war era, Brazil began to assert itself in discussions and on topics differing 
from the United States and the west. Brazil’s foreign policy morphed into advocacy for 
everyone outside the inner circle of early-modernized states, those that industrialized 
prior to the twentieth century, it became a policy of “universalism, based on 
receptiveness toward all countries.”184 In the 1960s and 70s under military control, 
defensive power became a priority, as did nuclear ambitions, as an outside chance at 
gaining military clout regardless of the nation’s historically passive foreign policy. 
Brazil’s nuclear ambitions demonstrated a continued pursuit of power, even if its 
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methods deviated from the international norm. Further demonstrating its willingness not 
to conform, Brazil refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; holding out until 
1998, well after the military regime fell.185 It is also worth noting that Brazil still refuses 
to sign the additional protocol which would allow international inspectors additional 
measures of access to inspect state nuclear programs.186 
For Brazilian leadership, it became clear that power was not to be attained 
through military might and economic advantage, thus, an alternative path of soft power 
would have to be Brazil’s way to garner partnerships and spread the agenda of universal 
inclusion. This power play would lay the foundation for non-traditional alliances and 
additional nonconforming policies. Following the military regime, the Lula 
administration was possibly the most ambitious for Brazilian power politics. Trikunas 
described one of Lula’s primary initiatives as the desire to be “representative and 
spokesperson for ‘the rest’…as a middle man between developing and developed 
countries.”187 His predecessor, Henrique Cardoso, a social democrat and proponent of the 
free market, laid the groundwork for Lula’s successes through sound fiscal policies that 
got the economy on track after years of hyperinflation.188 Lula on the other hand, was not 
as interested in just joining the global forum as a compliant rubber stamp, his objective 
was to be an agenda setter and counterbalance to the occidental powers.  
Examples of Lula’s pursuit of alternative power platforms include the 
monumental formation of the BRICS following the global economic crisis of 2008. 
Brazil joined with Russia, India, China, and South Africa to create an alternative geo-
political power source to offset the west. Additionally, after discovering large deposits of 
oil off Brazil’s coast, there were initial flirtations with joining OPEC, the mega 
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international oil cartel.189 A year later, Lula backed away from that decision, stating it 
was “not at all in [Brazil’s] interest to participate in OPEC.”190  
One of Lula’s boldest efforts was to challenge U.S. and western ideology by 
negotiating a nuclear enrichment deal between Iran and Turkey in 2010.191 The Iranian 
nuclear agenda was one of the era’s most controversial strategic issues. The U.S. and 
western powers had struggled for years to restrain the Iranian agenda. This self-assertion 
by Brazil to interpose into major international affairs was a clear statement that Brazil 
had finally assumed its “responsibilities in a multi-polar world,” as stated by Antonio 
Patriota, Brazil’s deputy foreign minister.192 Lula departed Tehran the triumphant 
negotiator, but before he landed in Brazil, Tehran reneged on the bargain, declaring it 
would continue enriching its own uranium. Despite the diplomatic failure, Brazil 
attempted to stay the course in support of Tehran when, as a non-permanent member of 
the UN security council, Brazil went against all five permanent members in their decision 
to increase sanctions against Iran for its nuclear ambitions.193 Alfred Montero suggests 
that Brazil’s defiance on international nuclear policy was not centered in an “ambitious 
motivation” to change the debate, but to “resist” the dominant capitalist powers on key 
foreign policy issues.194  
 More recently, Brazil has sought out alternative regional alliances demonstrating 
its desire to lead in the south as well as promote soft power globally. Brazil made a 
significant contribution to establishing organizations like the Latin American trade 
groups Mercosul (Common Market of the South), UNASUR (Union of South American 
Nations), and CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), in which it 
has exercised its leadership and ability to add stability in the region. With many of these 
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programs, like previous international alliances, their longevity is challenged by a lack of 
funding, manpower, and prioritization due to Brazil’s evolving domestic priorities. Brazil 
has however, taken the initiative to lead on other pertinent global discussions, on which it 
has seen great domestic success, such as the fight against HIV/AIDS, climate change, and 
poverty reduction. All of these examples regardless of their success demonstrate the 
Brazilian ambition to lead in the region and the world, whether or not those policies are 
congruous with global norms. 
C. NGO AND IGO INITIATED REFORMS 
After World War I, when Brazil first began to engage in extra-regional 
international affairs, the nation invited political and economic partnerships and 
investment to Brazil. These outward ventures opened the door for external demand 
internal political and business reform. At approximately the same time Brazil was gaining 
control of its economy in the mid-1990s, the globe was reactively assessing the impact of 
political corruption. IGOs and third party NGOs emerged as the forum for international 
debate and a platform for encouraging states to adopt reforms in exchange for inclusion 
and various means of economic support. As the corruption debate grew, attention focused 
on promoting good governance and macro-level initiatives to, as Paul Heywood 
suggested, “limit opportunities for corruption,” and build a strong network of 
accountability to dampen the effects and the frequency of corruption around the globe.195 
As a result of Brazil’s desire to be a major power in the world it pursued international 
acceptance and participatory inclusion; however, it may not have anticipated the 
symptomatic effects of inclusion. Ultimately, increased associations would gradually 
erode the barriers to transparency that for years had masked hidden agendas, bribery, and 
favoritism that had become the norm in politics and business. This section presents some 
of the major initiatives that have contributed to Brazil’s anticorruption movement. 
One of Brazil’s earliest deliberate engagements with an organization committed to 
transparency began in the early-1990s with the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
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and Development, (OECD).196 Although not a member of the OECD, Brazil began to 
adhere to many OECD standards, with aspirations of receiving an invitation to the 
exclusive group. In 1997, under the Cardoso administration, Brazil attended and later 
committed to the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials.197 By joining the convention, Brazil agreed to extensive international scrutiny 
of domestic laws and regulations, as well as the nation’s enforcement and deterrence 
mechanisms to combat bribery. Each state that committed to the organization agreed to 
promote “cleaner foreign investment” and “sustainable long-term growth” through 
openness in their domestic economies.198 As of February 2017, Brazil has undergone five 
periodic investigations as part of the convention, in which lengthy reports and 
recommendations were made to facilitate the goal of full compliance the original 
charter.199 
Brazil doubled down on its commitment to anticorruption early in the Lula 
administration, when in 2003 it became a member of the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC). The convention, adopted at the 2003 UN General 
Assembly, signified the international community’s collective resolve and cooperation in 
the fight to eliminate corruption. As a part of the agreement process, participating nations 
agreed to partake in a broad international review of domestic anticorruption measures, 
and to then demonstrate resolve in applying the identified reform suggestions.200 In 
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response to the critical assessment, Brazil committed to prepare legislation that would 
entrust the justice system with administrative anticorruption mechanisms.201  
As a result of cooperation in organizations like the UNCAC and OECD 
Convention Brazil made an effort to begin conforming to the international 
recommendations. In reports as recently as February of 2017, action is still needed to be 
in full compliance.202 Changing national laws is no doubt an arduous task, but perhaps 
more so when state officials are uninterested in changing the laws that would curtail their 
financial benefits. In situations like this, additional incentives are required that go beyond 
external forces that garner modest support in the bureaucracy. For Brazil, the added 
incentive resulted from the June 2013 protests against government corruption and the 
waste of public funds. Citizen outcry for change proved to be a decisive turning point in 
the fight against corruption. When Dilma could no longer avoid the crowds that swarmed 
Brazil’s largest cities and even the planalto capital grounds, she called upon the 
administration to produce immediate policies to combat corruption and appease the 
public. As a result of those chaotic hours, the Anticorruption Law 12.846/2013 was 
produced.203 As indicated however, laws do not materialize over night; this particular law 
was likely in the making for some time as seen in its distinct mirroring of principles 
outlined in the OECD and UNCAC charters.204 It is probable, that factions within the 
government had versions of these proposals already prepared and waiting for the requisite 
support to push them through. The new law entrusts the justice system with the authority 
to take action against activities harmful to public administration, organized crime, 
embezzlement, money laundering, illicit enrichment by nature of ones influences, and it 
even combats the obstruction of justice.205  
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Not to be overlooked in this analysis are the particularly important contributions 
of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. These institutions are a key source of assistance in supporting growth and 
development in countries plagued by poor governance and endemic corruption. While 
supporting nations through financial loans and investment, they play a key part in 
reinforcing the need for states to accept sound fiscal policies as well as adhere to 
anticorruption norms. Lenders are not as likely to lend when the borrower is unlikely to 
fulfill the terms of repayment. It is therefore, in lenders interest to vet all requests. Unlike 
domestic banks, the IMF and World Bank go to the effort of building up nations and their 
financial institutions to facilitate good investments and growth. As incentive for good 
governance and transparent economic standards, states receive favorable credit ratings 
that help them qualify for better loans and inherently make them attractive locations for 
foreign business and investment.  
Another layer of international influence for state behavior is the work of 
unaffiliated not-for-profit third party organizations that make it their priority to find and 
expose public misconduct. One of the leading organizations that contributes to the fight 
against corruption is Transparency International. The organization is known for its 
relentless efforts to expose wrongdoing and produce transparency with its reputation as a 
whistleblower. It routinely makes immediate and clear public statements to highlight 
public malfeasance to the world. Additionally, one of the more universally recognized 
tools in assessing state corruption is the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index.  
One example of Transparency International acting against corruption in Brazil 
was demonstrated in May of 2016, amid the ongoing lava jato investigations and the 
impeachment process of President Rousseff. At the time, interim President, Michael 
Temer, attempted to demonstrate commitment to anticorruption reform by replacing the 
nation’s chief anticorruption organization, the CGU. Unfortunately, shortly after the 
newly minted Ministry for Transparency, Monitoring, and Control (MTMC) was set into 
place, interim President Michael Temer and his appointed head of the new organization, 
Fabiano Silveiro, came under fire after Silveiro was caught on tape giving advice on how 
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the president of the Senate could navigate the Petrobras corruption scandal.206 The irony 
of corruption at the head of an anticorruption organization elicited a sharp censure from 
Transparency International, in which the organization rescinded support to the MTMC 
and asserted: “Brazil needs an effective and unimpeachable anti-corruption program to 
win back trust in politics.”207 The efforts of international organizations like these to 
advertise wrong doing to the global community has an impact on state appearances and 
business perceptions that influence the desirability of working with that particular state.  
D. TIPPING POINT 
Peter Gourevitch argued that the international system can levy heavy burdens on a 
developing society, with results that can be well intentioned, but at times detrimental.208 
On the extreme side of those burdens, misallocated pressures can cripple a weak state and 
even incite revolution. Gourevitch warned that all revolutions “begin with some 
international disturbance that overtaxed the political system.”209 While Brazil has not 
experienced the kind of revolution that upends the political landscape like the revolutions 
in Russia, France, or China, they did experience a transformative change provoked by 
international pressures that peaked in the summer of 2013. The events that motivated 
Brazil’s 20-cent revolution were not rising bus fares, although that was the initial 
complaint; if so, the protests likely would have remained localized to São Paulo and 
would have also been resolved locally. Instead, the protests grew and became a tidal 
wave of frustration and public discontent. For years the public was told that Brazil was on 
the rise and that it was their time to join the ranks of the global elite; however, the cost of 
rising to “first-class” came at a price that the nation was incapable of sustaining.210 
Furthermore, the World Cup and the Olympics that Lula energetically pursued, to 
demonstrate Brazil had arrived, backfired. Instead of seizing the moment to rise above its 
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humble moorings, the nation reached its limit, inciting the people to produce possibly the 
largest anticorruption protest in history.211 
Crises often lead to change, reform and revolution, and in June of 2013 Brazil was 
on the cusp of crisis. The economy had begun to slip and Rousseff’s PT was grasping at 
straws to keep the coalition from falling apart and her from losing the 2014 election. The 
government was rocked by the lengthy protests that questioned state legitimacy, but what 
fanned public indignation was the enormous amount of money going into preparations for 
stadiums and venues to host an international spectacle. The public was fed up with 
paying premium rates for government services but getting third-world returns. According 
to an OECD assessment of 44 countries, Brazil’s education system ranked in the bottom 
three in each category of mathematics, reading, and science.212 According to a review by 
the World Health Organization Brazil ranked 125 out of 191 nations for overall health 
care performance.213 Brazil also ranks number 16 out of 145 nations for most unequal 
countries by distribution of wealth.214 Considering that Brazilians contribute to taxes at a 
rate of approximately 35 percent, it is not hard to understand why a 20-cent rise in bus 
fares was the spark that lit the fuse of frustrations.  
In 2005 the news broke about the Workers Party vote buying scheme, but 
prosecutorial work drug on for seven more years before the mensalão would close. In the 
meantime, Lula was busily pacing the nation for an epic showcase in 2014 and 2016. As 
construction for the World Cup began, it was apparent the cost was taking a toll. Brazil 
chose to build more than the FIFA minimum of eight soccer stadiums, opting for twelve, 
and racking up a bill that nearly doubled that of South Africa’s World Cup only four 
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years prior.215 Some stadiums were updated and others were built from the ground up, 
like the Estádio Nacional in Brazil’s capital, but like many of the other stadiums, the city 
is not a host to one of the nation’s top flight regional teams and has gone unused since the 
games ended.216 In 2013 and continuing through the Olympic games, Brazilians saw 
billions of dollars being poured into Brazil’s Potemkin village while many remained 
impoverished, under educated, and mistreated in the midst of security crack downs to 
clean up the slums in preparation for the world.  
On June 17 of 2013, the week after the initial protests turned into a violent 
struggle between unprepared police forces and the public; the streets of cities around the 
nation filled with disappointed civilians by the thousands, each carrying a list of 
grievances that had festered for some time. The protests set in motion a series of changes 
that transformed politics in Brazil. The people finally achieved a point of leverage over a 
predatory and corrupt class of politicians that had experienced few consequences for their 
scandalous actions and indulgences. In unprecedented fashion, politicians ceded real 
power to the public and also the judiciary, unleashing the powers that have produced the 
equally unprecedented prosecution of dozens of Brazil’s most powerful politicians and 
business executives. Meanwhile, the country carried on and hosted a spectacular World 
Cup and Olympic Games, amidst the unraveling of the national economy and Dilma’s 
presidency.  
E. SUMMARY 
Alfred Montero stated that Brazil “seems trapped in a middle power dilemma, of 
knowing that it ought to be a bigger player in international relations,” but struggles with 
how to assert itself.217 Brazil has not relinquished its aspirations for first-tier status in the 
world, and even continues to lobby for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, 
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while being an active participant at all of the other major international policy venues. 
However, the continued aspirations have brought on much scrutiny and increased 
standards that challenge political corruption. International organizations welcomed 
Brazil’s participation, and in many cases provided constructive criticism and 
recommendations to help make Brazil better for all Brazilians through transparency and 
good political and business practices. By looking outward, Brazilian sovereignty was 
slowly whittled down, exposing corrupt networks and manipulative power resources to 
invested foreign influences. Domestic transparency was thus assisted by the influences of 
multiple external agencies, but the tipping point was the decision to host the World Cup 
and Olympics in an expensive but brief two-year period. The burden proved to be too 
much for the public to ignore the gross mismanagement of public funds, resulting in a 
social movement that rearranged an archaic balance of political power.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this thesis is to answer: how Brazil suddenly transformed its 
institutions to combat government corruption and why did it occur in the period between 
2007 and 2017 and not earlier? The result of the research presented here identified three 
main pillars for influencing democratic reform; they are democratic consolidation, 
domestic accountability, and exogenous forces. Each of the three institutions was 
analyzed in the context of what Brazil achieved and what forces were most important in 
creating change. As a result, the findings of this thesis indicate that the most important 
pillar in these events was exogenous forces; however, it is critical to understand that none 
of them would have created this situation independently without contributions from the 
other two elements. 
There are strong arguments for democratic consolidation and the gradual 
democratization process, contending that under the right conditions Brazil could have 
achieved these measures of transparency and judicialization through incremental reform 
and rebalancing of powers. To the contrary, however, one has but to listen periodically to 
the news line coming from Brazil to recognize that corruption is endemic, and there is no 
shortage of individuals who are willing to take advantage of the system’s weaknesses and 
profit from the lack of transparency. As an example of this, Brazil’s Senate Justice 
Committee is comprised of 13 members, of whom, 10 are currently being investigated for 
corruption as a part of the lava jato.218 Additionally, during President Rouseff’s 
impeachment proceedings, 303 of the 513 deputies in the lower house were undergoing 
some form of criminal or corruption investigation and 49 of the 81 senators were 
similarly accused.219 This serves as an indicator that even though there are well-
intentioned public servants among the group, they are likely in the minority. Thus, to 
suggest that Brazil’s politicians led a top-down effort to transform corruption lacks the 
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credibility to propose that the necessary two-thirds consensus would have been achieved 
in either house. Ultimately, of the three pillars, in this situation, democratic consolidation 
is the least influential in terms of anticorruption and the likelihood of self-regulation.  
Arguments in support of domestic accountability contend that in order to keep 
politicians in check, they must inherently be held accountable to a demanding public with 
the ability to make politicians pay for their actions. As indicated throughout the research, 
the political system only recently found the capacity to hold government officials 
accountable. Additionally, for many years political careers in Brazil have been extended 
due to the convoluted and indirect nature of its proportional representation system of 
voting. This system makes it difficult to overcome the deep protective networks of 
political party priorities. It was not until the Clean Records law of 2010 that public 
discontent swayed the government to adopt measures to prevent corrupt politicians from 
running for office. There is no doubt that without public demand for change and the 
credible threat of consequences at the ballot box, government officials lack sufficient 
incentives to curtail their corrupt practices.  
The most persuasive arguments that explain what occurred during this period in 
Brazil are those that describe international forces applying pressure on the state and the 
people and enabling transparency reforms. Brazil’s ambition to be a leader in 
international decision-making led to interdependence and assimilation of domestic 
institutions with international states and organizations. Additionally, the desire to project 
Brazil as a first-class state through the World Cup and the Olympics brought a visible 
representation to the public of the government’s international priorities, superseding 
domestic priorities. The result was a galvanized public discontent with its government, 
which sparked a social movement. That movement then triggered a political power shift 
and significant reforms to empower the judiciary. 
In any analysis of the three pillars of anticorruption forces, domestic 
accountability is an essential pillar. That being the case, domestic accountability and 
democratic consolidation or domestic accountability and international influence could 
achieve transparency reform without the third pillar, provided the conditions are right. 
Conversely, the pairing of democratization and international forces in an already corrupt 
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system is less likely to produce significant transparency without accountability to the 
public. In democratic societies with free and open elections, when the public is heard and 
believed to be serious in their demand for change, politicians respond to public demand 
when the likelihood of losing their position is at stake. In the context of this research, it 
was shown that the likelihood of a pro-reform movement in Brazil is historically low, and 
combined with a generally ambivalent perception of politics, the protests were an 
anomaly in Brazilian contemporary culture. Yet, many Brazilians became involved and 
expressed high levels of interest and discontent, indicating that there was possibly some 
other trigger inciting the sudden change.  
It is possible that democratization and social activism could have produced the 
changes discussed here, but it would have occurred at a much later date. If Lula had not 
been so active in his outward ambitions, the nation would not have invited the necessary 
scrutiny and political critiques that enabled legal reforms when the nation was prepared 
to adopt them. Additionally, if the pressure of paying for the World Cup and the 
Olympics had not occurred as the Brazilian economy began to slip, the government may 
not have demanded increased contributions from the people, and thus instigating the 
unrest of 2013.  
Furthermore, the evolutions of the protests give additional indications that what 
instigated discontent is not what the protests will ultimately be remembered for. Initially, 
the protests were localized to São Paulo over a planned increase in transit costs, 
indicating that the nation’s most populous state recognized the need for increased 
resources. In response, the public, feeling overburdened, started a peaceful 
demonstration. Later, Brazilians around the country who were unaffected by the 
increased bus fares, but sympathized with the over-burdensome taxation system were 
incensed when the protests were repressed violently. The protests then became a national 
demonstration against government inadequacies and gross negligence of public 
responsibilities. The people demanded immediate change to the perception that 
politicians could live in their ivory towers insulated from the hunger and deprivations of 
the favela. The public was mobilized, not because the economy had begun to slip to the 
point that the average citizen felt the difference in their pocket book because the economy 
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did not retract until 2014. The public mobilized because they could see the visible 
transition of government priorities away from providing for the public to hosting the 
World Cup and the Olympics, largely for international prestige. 
The final assessment of Brazil’s anticorruption process is likely still a few years 
off. The Supreme Court is still overburdened and the Brazilian political privilege law 
called Foro Privilegiado ensures that cases of seated politicians are only reviewed by the 
Supreme Court when time permits. The limitations of Brazil’s federal courts thus impact 
the overall speed and success of bringing the lava jato to full closure. Regardless, the 
precedent has been made and the judiciary is far more capable than it was prior to 2010 
when the mensalão case achieved its first successes. As for the nation, Brazil has an 
abundance of resources and social capital, but turning around the current recession takes 
great effort and sacrifice by both the government and the people. Politicians must look to 
what is best for the nation or be replaced by those committed to such a cause. As for the 
people, additional financial sacrifices may be necessary to balance the budget in the 
short-term to achieve success in the long-term, but they can feel confident that they 
helped produce dramatic political changes for a better future. 
For interested agencies and nations, this research has given credence to the efforts 
of organizations that are committed to making the world a better place for all participants 
and sometimes in spite of some participants. This exploration demonstrates that perpetual 
but consistent steering of willing states toward transparency and accountability can help 
engender good governance and anticorruption measures. The situation in Brazil, although 
burdensome, may prove to be a significant turning point in which political, social, and 
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